Military naval forces
US: 5 squads (I Antilles squad Admiral Sampson, II Atlantic squad Commodore Schley, III Blockade division comm. Watson, IV Surveillance Division Commodore Howell, V Coastal Division.
Sampson's squadron with blockade division: 3 battleships (New York, Iowa, Indiana), 4 protected cruisers (Cincinnati, Marblehead, Detroit, Montgomery), 2 undefended cruisers (Dolphin and Mayflower), 4 coastguards, 6 protected gunboats, 6 torpedo boats.
Atlantic Squadron (Commodore Schley): Three battleships (Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas), 3 cruisers (Columbia, New Orleans, Minneapolis).
Surveillance division: 1 protected cruiser (San Francisco), 4 auxiliary cruisers (Dixie, Yosemite, Yankee, Prairie)
Coastal Division: 10 antiquated monitors and other poorly made vessels.
Spain: I Atlantic Squadron, (Admiral Cervera), II Antilles Squadron (Admiral Monterola), III Reserve Squadron (Admiral Camara).
Atlantic squadron: 4 battleships (Maria Teresa, Viscaya, Oquendo, Colón), 3 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 2 honestroyers, but most of the ships were crippled either as gunnery or speed
Antilles squadron: 5 undefended cruisers (Alfonso XII, Reina Mercedes, Venadito, Infanta Isabel, Isabel II), 5 torpedo cruisers (Ensenada, M. Pinzon, Nueva Espana, Molins, V. Pinzón), 6 gunboats.
Reserve squadron: 3 battleships (Pelayo, Charles V, Numancia), 3 torpedo boats (Audax, Osado, Proserpina), 3 auxiliary cruisers (Rapido, Patriota, Buenosayres), 7 honorary ships, not usable were cruisers Alfonso XIII and Lepanto.
U.S.: (Admiral Dewey) 4 protected cruisers (Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston) for 17 900 t, 2 gunboats and 2 honorary ships for 2 500 t, all with speeds from 10 to 21 knots.
Spain: 2 protected cruisers (Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon) for 20 400 t and 14 knots of speed and 5 unprotected cruisers (Reina Cristina,Castilla, Don Juan of Austria, Don Antonio Ulloa, Velasco) for 7 000 t and 12 knots of speed, however 2 ships (Castilla and Ulloa) were unable to move offshore.
The squadron that Spain sent to the West Indies was not the best that the Spanish Navy could have organized, which, although put on notice for about a month before the declaration of war, failed to fit the most powerful and fastest ships at its disposal into a single squadron. For their part, the United States divided the fleet into two squadrons, potentially inferior to what Spain could have had at its disposal.
After an aborted attempt to supply the Cuban rebels with arms and ammunition,Sampson's squadron imposed the blockade on Cuba on April 29, abandoning it, however, on May 9 to take on Puerto Rico, where it arrived on the 12th of the same month, while Schley's squadron remained at Hampton Roads to cover the U.S. coast. Meanwhile, Cervera's Spanish squadron was forming up at the Cape Verde Islands (in Portuguese territory), so, leaving the islands on April 29, it took to Martinique, arriving there on May 10. Admiral Cervera from Martinique could have attempted an attack on Oregon, departing from Bahia (Brazil) on May 9 to join Sampson's squadron, but he decisively avoided such an engagement because of the lack of coal. So Cervera set his sights on Curaçao (Dutch colony), since Puerto Rico was blocked by Sampson, arriving there on May 14; in Curaçao on the day on May 15, Cervera departed again for Cuba, but instead of setting his sights on Cienfuegos (which would have been the most suitable base for his team), he set his sights on Santiago, probably because of the shorter distance from Curaçao, where he arrived on May 19.
At this point, noting Cervera's position, Sampson's team was taken to Cuba, while Schley's team could move to Charleston. On May 23 the admirals were ordered to concentrate on Santiago, leaving only four monitors and a few gunboats and torpedo boats at Havana. Until May 26 it would be possible for Cervera's squadron to attempt to force the blockade of Santiago, until Schley's squadron also arrived, and in a council of war it was decided by majority vote to remain inside Santiago harbor. During May and June there were few naval battles and bombardments in Cuba. The city of Santiago, which presented an easy defense from the sea side anyway, was much more difficult to defend from the land side.
At Admiral Sampson's request, after a chaotic organization of V Corps transportation from Tampa, General Shafter landed a force of about 16,000 men at Daiquiri (near Santiago); the landing, which began on June 20, was not completed until the 26th of the same month.
Fought near Cárdenas, between the American torpedo boat USS Foote under Lieutenant William Ledyard Rodgers and the Spanish gunboat Ligera under Lieutenant Antonio Pérez Rendón. After a fierce firefight, the badly damaged Foote was forced to withdraw. It was the first battle of the war as well as the first Spanish naval success.
At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Navy detached a force of two protected cruisers, 16 auxiliary cruisers, 12 torpedo boats and many other units including armed tugs, yachts and coal ships to blockade the Cuban coast with the aim of cutting off supplies to the Spanish army. It proved to be a difficult task because of the large number of inlets and natural harbors on those coasts that allowed the much inferior Spanish ships to break the blockade many times. One of those ports was Cárdenas. The naval units based there were the gunboats Alerta, Ligera and Antonio López, the last of which was a former Spanish Line tugboat that had ceded it to the navy and armed it with a Nordenfelt machine gun. Alerta and Ligera mounted a 42 mm cannon and a 37 mm Maxim. The harbor was supposedly defended by two coastal batteries, but the Spanish accounts did not mention their presence before their installation on May 12. The entrances to the bay were covered by 20 Bustamante mines, most of them defective, and a 70-man company of marines had been detached to garrison the town. The gunboats belonged to the Spanish Caribbean Squadron under Admiral Vicente Manterola, and most of its units were described as "useless even to the coastal police." Antonio López , however, had captured the privateer ship Genoveva and the schooner William Todd a few years earlier. The Spanish gunboat squadron, consisting of two steam lances and an armed tug, remained unharmed until the end of the war, when all units were sold by the Spanish government.
On April 25, the Ligera was on patrol at the entrance to the port of Cárdenas. Her commander was Lieutenant Antonio Pérez Rendón y Sánchez, an experienced Cadiz-born officer who had witnessed action against Cuban insurgents many times during the war. The American torpedo boat Foote, a 142-ton warship armed with three 1-pound guns and three 457-mm torpedo tubes, was sighted off Cayo Diana. Both ships soon opened fire at each other. The American fired faster but with less accuracy, about 70 rounds, of which only one hit the Ligera, while the latter fired only 10. Damage and casualties aboard the Spanish ship were minimal. The Foote on the contrary took several hits that caused severe damage leaving the fighting shrouded in smoke and with her boilers badly damaged. At the time, the Spanish believed that the U.S. torpedo boat was the USS Cushing.
Antonio Rendón was awarded the Naval Cross of Maria Cristina for his achievement, which was acclaimed by the public.
The Spanish naval successes of the war were mainly due to the actions of their small coast guard ships. In addition to actions off Cárdenas, they confronted the American Mosquito Squadron with some success at Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, and even in Philippine waters. There the gunboat Elcano captured the American boat Saranac on April 26, 1898. Saranac , under the command of Captain Bartaby, was carrying 1 640 tons of coal from Newcastle, New South Wales, to Iloilo for Admiral Dewey's fleet.
In early May 1898, the small 142-ton torpedo boat USS Winslow, under Lieutenant John Bernadou, and the gunboat of the same name USS Winslow, around 1898, blockaded Cardenas. On May 8, the USS Machias left the blockade for a patrol, leaving the Winslow as the only American ship at Cardenas. This prompted the Spanish gunboats to attempt to break the blockade. USS Winslow was armed with 1-pound rapid fire ports and three 18-inch (457 mm) torpedo tubes with a crew of twenty men. Machias was a much larger gunboat armed with eight 4-inch, four 6-pounder and four 1-pounder guns. The Machias had a crew of about 150 men and officers but only managed to participate in the last minutes of combat.
The Spanish forces again consisted of the Antonio Lopez, the Alerta and the Ligeria, all units armed with 6-pounder rapid-fire guns each manned by an average of twenty men. The Spanish garrison at Cardenas manned two coastal batteries, one was a battery occupied by a few guns and artillerymen, the other was filled with at least three field pieces and about 100 infantrymen with long-range weapons, but neither of these forces was able to engage since the battle was being fought outside their range. The American forces also suspected that the Spanish had laid a marine minefield around the harbor with only one way in or out of the harbor. A buoy was placed beyond the minefield marking the extent to which Spanish gunboats could fire. The Spanish naval forces were under the command of Lieutenant Antonio Pérez Rendón .
When the Machias sailed east for her patrol, a few hours later the Winslow spotted a lot of activity in Spanish harbor, so Bardanou directed her ship toward Cardenas. Seeing the Winslow all alone, the three Spanish gunboats made a sortie and headed toward the American ship. Lieutenant Rendon signaled to his men that they opened fire with their three guns combined as the Winslow passed the buoy from a distance of about a mile. Instead of fleeing as suspected by the Spanish, Lieutenant John Bernadou turned his ship to the right in the direction of the attacking squadron and opened fire. These rapid-fire 1-pound guns worked very well according to reports, hitting the Spanish ships that were positioned close together. The duel continued for several minutes until Winslow approached at a closer range, Lieutenant Bernadou was able to maneuver his ship so that his two bow guns fired and hit all three Spanish ships simultaneously. After about forty minutes of fighting, the three gunboats dispersed and headed into port.
The American gunners continued firing, and during the retreat the gunboat Antonio Lopez was hit just as they approached their safety zone under the batteries. The shot entered the aft section of the hull and exploded inside the ship. The Antonio Lopez stopped retarding disabled, but continued firing her 6-pounder. One of the other gunboats came to her rescue and attached a tow line to the Antonio Lopez and began to pull her to safety. Having heard the sound of gunfire, the Machias turned around aiming for Cardenas and arriving just as the fighting was drawing to a close. Two miles away the Machias opened fire with her 4-inch guns. Two shots were fired but neither hit, yet the Spaniards stopped firing and concentrated on their escape. Entering the safe avenue through the supposed minefield, the Americans could not follow the three gunboats. It was later discovered on May 11 that there were no sea mines at Cardenas or that U.S. Navy forces simply could not locate them.
The coastal batteries never engaged as the Americans did not come within their range. The USS Winslow was not hit at all during the battle due to her commander constantly keeping the ship at a high speed; in addition, the sea was rough that day. Spanish casualties are unknown although the three gunboats sustained damage, one of which was apparently crippled. More than seventy-five shells were fired by American forces in a clash that lasted only about fifty minutes. In accounts of the battle, Lieutenant Bernadou is credited for his bravery in attacking a superior enemy force, although his victory was overshadowed a few days later, on May 11, 1898, when the more important Second Battle of Cardenas was fought.
In May 1898, a small U.S. Navy squadron, consisting of the torpedo boats USS Foote and USS Winslow, the gunboats USS Wilmington and USS Machias , and the USS Hudson, operated off the northern coast of Cuba. On May 11, 1898, this fleet entered Cárdenas Bay to destroy the three small Spanish gunboats moored in the harbor. After sweeping the area for mines, Captain Todd ordered the Winslow to approach the shore and investigate a steamer moored along the pier to determine if the ship was an enemy warship.
The Spanish squadron was still composed of the same three ships: Ligera , Alerta and Antonio López, commanded this time by Mariano Mateu.
At 1:35 p.m., Winslow reached a point about 1,500 yards from his prey when a puff of white smoke from the Antonio López's gun marked the beginning of an artillery duel that lasted an hour and 20 minutes. Winslow responded with his 1-pounders. The Spaniards concentrated their efforts on Winslow, who soon received several direct hits. The first direct hit on the torpedo boat destroyed both her steam system and manual steering gear. The crew attempted to rig an auxiliary steering system, but exposing the side to the enemy, a shot pierced the hull near the engine room knocking out the port main engine. Trying to maneuver with her remaining engine to evade enemy fire she maintained a steady response fire with her 1 lb. Wilmington and Hudson aimed their guns at the ship and the Spanish coast, and the combined fire of the three American warships knocked out the Spanish tug while several waterfront buildings caught fire.
The Winslow then asked the Hudson to tow her out of action. As the Hudson began to tow the Winslow out to sea, one of the last Spanish shells to hit the torpedo boat struck her near the starboard gun and killed Ensign Worth Bagley, who had helped direct the warship's maneuvers by carrying instructions from the bridge to the base of the engine room staircase. Ensign Bagley became known as the first U.S. naval officer killed in the Spanish-American War, killed along with four other sailors, John Barberes, John Daniels, George B. Meek and EB Tunnell.
The Spanish used submarine cables as a means of communicating not only with the rest of Cuba but also with the Spanish command. These cables had many key junctions such as near Cienfuegos. The cables connected to Havana, the port of Santiago, and then branched off to other Caribbean islands such as Jamaica. The cables came out of an easily identifiable structure that contained a critical hub for the submarine communications system. It could be easily destroyed, but inflicted only largely superficial damage that could be easily repaired in a short period of time. Therefore, the command decided to cut the three cables from the sea in several places, disrupting much of the communication between the Spanish and their operations in Cuba. This damage would have been much more difficult to repair, as the cables approached two inches in diameter, making cutting and, by extension, repairing, a difficult task. For this mission were sent, the cruiser USS Marblehead, the gunboat USS Nashville and the cutter USS Windom under the command of Captain Bowman H. McCalla.
The Marblehead and Nashville opened fire at the structure on land at 6:45 a.m. on May 11, 1898. Rather quickly, it collapsed under fire from the two warships. Ten minutes later, at 6:55 a.m., the warships dispatched their workboats, each carrying a minimum crew of sixteen, in order to minimize the risk of accidents. The element of surprise was quickly lost, however.
While the first cable was out of the line of fire, the second cable was not so easy to cut. Because of the coral formation, the cable was very difficult to trap in order to bring it to the surface and cut it. The Spanish forces were also much closer to the second cable, so the crew had to deal with both of these problems. In order to suppress the increased fire of the Spanish forces, both warships increased their bombardment. When the raid crew eventually managed to lift the second cable to cut it, they discovered the existence of a third, smaller cable. After the second had been cut, they moved on to search for this third and final cable, which they were unable to find, however, as a large contingent of Spanish forces arrived in Cienfuegos to repel what they thought at the time was a full-scale invasion. By 11:15 the raid was over.
After an hour-long firefight, two cables had been cut but a third cable near the shore remained intact turning the raid into only a partial success and lamenting the U.S. loss of two dead and 15 wounded.
Fought from June 6 to June 10, 1898, when American and Cuban forces took the strategically and commercially important port of Guantanamo. The capture of the bay by Spanish forces was instrumental in the subsequent Battle of Santiago de Cuba and the subsequent invasion of Puerto Rico. Although overshadowed by the land and sea battles at Santiago, the establishment of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay and the route of defense of Spanish troops by American and Cuban forces were important in the final Spanish defeat.
Despite the insurgents' nominal offensive position in the vicinity of Guantanamo Bay, the Spanish regulars and guerrillas occupied the city of Guantanamo, the port of Caimanera and the railroad that connected the two cities, large sugar mills and other peripheral strongpoints. Guantanamo's garrison consisted of about 5,000 men under the command of General Felix Pareja. A Spanish blockhouse stood on the hill overlooking the village of Fisherman's Point near the entrance to the bay, and a fort on Cayo del Toro commanded the relatively narrow channel leading from the outer to the inner bay. The Spanish gunboat Sandoval was based at Caimanera in the inner bay, and a series of forts defended the railroad to the town of Guantanamo, 23 km inland. Cuban insurgents maintained coastal outposts from the mouth of the Yateras River, east of the bay, to a point 15 miles (24 km) west of Santiago, and were in undisputed possession of the western tip at the entrance to the bay.
The first successful U.S. raid against the bay occurred on June 6, with the arrival of the unprotected cruiser USS Marblehead, commanded by Commander Bowman H. McCalla, and the auxiliary cruisers USS St. Louis and Yankee , commanded by Willard H. Brownson. Commander McCalla had been detached by Admiral Sampson from the blockading fleet at Santiago and ordered to search the bay for a naval base. The St. Louis captain was to cut cables that had their terminus at a small station at Fisherman's Point and connected Cuba with Haiti and the outside world.
On a previous occasion, St. Louis, on a similar mission, had been driven out of the bay by the Spanish gunboat Sandoval. This time, when the three warships entered the bay at dawn, the Spanish soldiers gathered around the blockhouse on the hill known today as McCalla Hill. The blockhouse and the village were quickly obliterated by fire from the Marblehead. The Spanish gunboats Alvarado and Sandoval came down the channel from Caimanera to meet the attack, but they retreated hastily upon discovering the caliber of cannon used against them. The fort's only cannon on Cayo del Toro opened fire on the Marblehead to no effect until it was silenced.
The telegraph cables leading east to Cap-Haïtien , west to Santiago, and the small cable in the bay connecting Caimanera and Guantanamo City with Cap-Haïtien were all successfully cut, and from June 7 to July 5 Guantanamo City had no communication with the outside world.
Upon returning to the blockading fleet from reconnaissance, Marblehead carried two Cuban officers who had been brought to the ship from Leeward Point (western side) of Guantanamo Bay. They had been sent to Admiral Sampson by General Calixto García (the same man who figured with U.S. Lieutenant Rowan in the famous " Message to Garcia ") to report that Cuban forces, whose outposts occupied positions on the coast from the mouth of the Yateras to a point 15 miles (24 km) west of Santiago were at the disposal of the U.S. commander in chief. Commander McCalla from then on maintained close contact with General Pedro Pérez, commanding the Cuban rebel forces around the city of Guantanamo, through the latter's chief of staff, Colonel Vieta, thus receiving valuable advice and assistance.
With the decision to establish a base at Guantanamo Bay, the First Battalion of Marines , consisting of six companies of about 650 men (four infantry and one artillery), was ordered to proceed in the converted transport USS Panther, and join the fleet off Santiago. The first battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington USMC, had been undergoing battalion exercises pending orders at Key West. The Panther reached Santiago on June 9, 1898. That same day, prior to the battalion's landing, Navy Commander Bowman H. McCalla of the USS Marblehead, the officer in command of the landings, approved a campsite selected for the Marines by Lt. Col. Huntington. The site selected was a flat ridge atop a hill, above the village of Fisherman's Point, and designated Camp McCalla. In addition to an artillery company equipped with a battery of four 3-inch rapid-fire artillery pieces and a Colt-Browning Model 1895 machine gun , each Marine was equipped with the Navy's new rapid-fire loader rifle, the Model 1895 Lee Navy . Both the Colt machine gun and Lee rifles used a new high velocity smokeless powder cartridge, the 6 mm Lee Navy .
The Navy battalion landed unopposed on June 10 with five of its six companies, leaving the artillery company aboard to unload the ship because Commander Reiter, the captain of the Panther , had refused to allow the use of the ship's personnel for unloading operations . Reiter also refused to allow the unloading of the remainder of the Marines' small arms ammunition, claiming that it was needed as ballast for the ship. lieutenant colonel Huntington asked commander McCalla for help, who ordered Reiter to release the Marines' ammunition immediately. "Sir, escape immediately and land with the Panther's crew, 50,000 rounds of 6 mm. ammunition," McCalla ordered. "In the future, do not require Colonel Huntington to break out or land his escorts with members of his command. Use your officers and men for this purpose, and promptly supply the Commandant of Marines with whatever he may desire."
The marines burned crude village huts and the remains of the blockhouse with all their contents to avoid the possibility of yellow fever . The Spaniards had fled so quickly that clothes, money, jewelry and weapons were left behind. The battalion raised the American flag, the first U.S. military unit to do so on Cuban soil, and sent detachments for outpost duties.
Lt. Col. Huntington ordered C Company to occupy a 150-foot-high hill located some distance from the main Marine position, and which could not be supported by the main body at Camp McCalla. Two forward outposts were established, one at a road junction located several hundred yards in front of the camp and known as "Crossroads," and one called "The Bridge" located across a road a mile and a half from the American camp, where Spanish forces were expected to bring artillery from Caimanera. With the sea behind them, the lack of mutual support between the outposts, and the thorny scrub and cacti of the arid hills stretching in a dense tangle in front of them, the Marines had a less than ideal tactical position. Commander McCalla pointed out to Lieutenant Colonel Huntington that his outposts were too far forward and could not be seen or supported in the dense underbrush between the outposts and the main camp. Three of the companies stacked their weapons and returned to the ship to help with unloading. Shortly after dark, the Marines consumed their first meal of coffee and galettes . Soon after, the first alarm went off. Voices were heard and lights could be seen in the grove, but there was no attack that night. The Spanish forces defending the area were desperately short of food and delayed the attack until the Marines had completed unloading their supplies in hopes of seizing American supplies.
By dawn, the marines had completed unloading their supplies and equipment, although artillery pieces and their ammunition were left aboard ship. The remaining companies of the battalion came ashore, and C Company was withdrawn from its isolated hillside outpost. The only sound in the groves was the cooing of mourning doves , a sound the Marines would later learn was a favorite call sign used by Spanish Loyalist guerrilla forces.
Lieutenant Colonel Huntington was joined in the afternoon by Colonel Laborde of the Cuban Army, who had been with Commander McCalla for several days as a pilot on Marblehead , and now had been sent ashore to assist the marines and provide intelligence on the enemy.
Laborde reported that the largest Spanish force in the area had its headquarters at the "Cuzco Well," 2 miles (3.2 km) southeast of Fisherman's Point. The well provided the only fresh water in the area. This occupying force of about 500 soldiers and guerrillas, combined with troops driven out of the blockhouse on the bay, posed the greatest threat to the U.S. base of operations. Laborde noted that seizing Cuzco Well and destroying it would inevitably force Spanish forces to retreat to Ciudad Guantanamo (Guantanamo City).
While they were talking, fire began in the grove in front of their position. Lieutenant Colonel Huntington led most of his command forward. However, the thorny tangle of trees, underbrush and cacti forced him to proceed with only one company.
Although naval fire support was now assured at Huntington, Camp McCalla was tactically inadequate. No attack had been planned, so no trenches were dug. Marine artillery had not even been landed. Located on the sands of the open beach, Marine camp proved an ideal target for snipers hiding in the bush.
At dawn (05:00) on Saturday, June 11, Spanish guerrillas opened fire on marines at Camp McCalla from the surrounding brush. Firing a volley from their rapid-fire Mauser rifles , the guerrillas advanced toward the camp. After heavy fighting, and supported by the reserve company (C Company), the Marines drove the enemy back into the bush, pursuing until the chase was abandoned in the dark. Two pickets on outpost duty, Soldiers William Dumphy and James McColgan, who had been sent as an alert patrol 100 yards from the forward outpost at "Crossroads," were later found dead, shot and cut numerous times in the face and body . Their weapons, shoes, belts and part of their clothes had been taken.
This was the beginning of what Huntington's executive officer, Major Henry Clay Cochrane, later called "his 100 hours of combat." At Camp McCalla, the Marines dug in and began firing at the hidden Spaniards, aided by three 3-inch field pieces and two additional 6 mm Colt-Browning machine guns that had been landed June 12 from the USS Texas . Marblehead gunfire passed over our heads and hit the nearby hills. Wearing large palm leaves tied to their uniforms for camouflage and firing smokeless powder cartridges, the Spanish forces were difficult to spot as they moved from bush to bush in the dense undergrowth.
On the evening of June 12, enemy forces came within fifty yards of Camp McCalla and a desperate firefight began. Marines responded with their Lee straight-pull rifles, along with machine gun and artillery fire from Marine 3-inch field pieces. Perhaps deterred by the intense artillery and machine gun fire, the Spaniards did not attempt to invade the field. Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs and Sergeant Charles H. Smith were both killed in this firefight. Marines later found several traces of blood, but no bodies, as the guerrillas removed their wounded and dead to hide the figures of the victims.
The next day, the marines were reinforced by about 60 Cubans under Lt. Col. Enrique Thomas. The Cubans had been equipped with rifles and white duck sailor uniforms by Commander McCalla of the USS Marblehead . Being familiar with guerrilla tactics, the Cuban insurgents deployed in pairs in front of the camp, burning bushes and brush as they advanced, thus denying the enemy cover. The Marblehead , which had provided ground bombardment on several occasions, steamed down the coast and projected the well at Cuzco. However, the Spanish attack resumed at dusk and two more marines, Staff Sergeant Henry Good and Private Goode Taurman, were killed.
By nightfall on June 13, the Marines were exhausted. They had not slept or rested for 100 hours. Relief or reinforcements were impossible, as U.S. Army troops had yet to leave the United States. The fighting continued for two more days.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas of the Cuban rebel forces advised Colonel Huntington to attack the Spanish garrison at Cuzco Well, consisting of four companies of Spanish infantry and two companies of loyalist guerrillas totaling about 500 men. By capturing and destroying the only nearby freshwater source, it was hoped that the defending Spanish forces would be forced to leave the area. Commander McCalla approved the plans and the attack was scheduled for 08:00 the next day.
Marine Companies C and D, about 160 men, under the command of Captain George F. Elliott , future commander of the Marine Corps , flanked by the Cuban fifty under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, would approach Cuzco along the cliffs on the seashore. A smaller Marine force would advance from an inland valley, holding a picket line for the main force, with reserve men to assist if necessary. The gunboat USS Dolphin was assigned to support the attack from the sea.
The day was already warm when the combined U.S.-Cuban force began its march on June 14. Colonel Laborde led the main force, and a Cuban scout named Polycarpio led a smaller force led by Second Lieutenant Magill. The march was slowed by the rugged terrain, fierce underbrush and increasing heat; at one point, the captains of Companies C and D of the main column had fallen behind due to heat exhaustion. It was almost 11:00 a.m. when the main force reached the steep horseshoe-shaped hill around the Cuzco Valley; the commanders of C and D Companies reached their units fifteen minutes later.
Around the same time, the Cubans, who were marching ahead of the Marine companies, were spotted by the enemy. A run for the crest of the hill began. The Marines and Cubans reached the summit first, under heavy Spanish and guerrilla fire. The smaller Marine force approached at the double, using their 6 mm (0.236 inch) Lee rifles to pour deadly crossfire on the enemy flank . Three of the four Colt-Browning M1895 machine guns accompanying the Marines were used by C Company in the fighting. According to Pvt. John Clifford of D Company, the machine guns were instrumental in supporting the Marine assault. This was the first known tactical use of machine gun fire for mobile fire support in offensive combat.
The light weight of the Marines' new Lee 6 mm cartridge proved to be of considerable benefit, allowing each Marine and machine gun crew to carry large amounts of ammunition over the mountainous and endless terrain. Halfway through the battle, the Cuban rebel forces ran out of 6 mm cartridges and were supplied with six more magazines (30 cartridges) from the belts of individual Marines, but none of the Americans ran out of ammunition , despite firing about sixty rounds each in the battle.
During this part of the fight, Captain Elliott had requested that the Dolphin provide fire support to the Marines by shelling the Spanish blockhouse and nearby positions with her naval guns. However, due to a miscommunication of signals, the gunboat unknowingly began firing shells into the direct path of a small force of fifty Marines and ten Cuban irregulars led by Second Lieutenant Magill, who were attempting to flank the Spanish position and potentially cut off any avenue of retreat. Attaching his handkerchief to a long stick and braving the Spanish fire, Sergeant John H. Quick took an exposed position on the ridge to immediately send a flag signal to Dolphin to adjust his fire. War Correspondent.
The Dolphin shifted fire to the enemy camp and blockhouse, and by 2 p.m. the Spanish had broken and fled the blockhouse. Unfortunately, 2nd Lt. Magill's men were delayed long enough to prevent them from breaking off a Spanish retreat, although his men did manage to capture the Spanish signal station and its heliograph equipment. As the Spanish forces retreated across a ravine on the other side of the valley, the marines opened fire at a range of 1,200 yards, firing volley after volley. The Spanish were unable to accurately return fire, allowing Marine Company B and Cuban rebels to close the distance, firing as they advanced. The Spaniards first attempted to concentrate fire on the Cubans and managed to kill two of them, but were again repulsed by the Marines' rifle fire, at which point the remaining enemy, who up to that point had retreated in good order, broke and scattered.
By 3:30 p.m., the enemy had left the battlefield and all firing had ceased. Most of the Spaniards had fled, but one lieutenant and 17 soldiers were captured and the enemy suffered 60 dead and 150 wounded. They had left behind 30 modern 7 mm Mauser rifles and ammunition. Two marines and two Cuban rebels had been wounded, and two Cuban rebels killed, who were buried where they fell. The most serious casualties suffered by the marines were from heatstroke , which disabled one officer and 22 men. Gunboat Dolphin took these aboard after the fighting was over for the return trip to Camp McCalla. The Spanish headquarters building (blockhouse) was burned and the freshwater well at Cuzco was destroyed, thus ending its immediate usefulness, even to the marines, whose officers would not allow them to drink from it before its destruction. Water was finally brought by the USS Dolphin after a two-hour wait.
Spanish forces retreated in small stragglers to Guantanamo, via Cayo del Toro and Caimanera. Apparently expecting U.S. forces to follow the victory, they fortified Dos Caminos , a small settlement at the junction of two roads, and added several forts to the number already erected on the rail line. The Spanish soldiers were apparently impressed by the Marines' firepower; upon arrival in Ciudad Guantanamo (Guantanamo City), surviving members of the Cuzco Well garrison informed General Pareja that they had been attacked by 10,000 Americans.
Camp McCalla saw no further attacks by Spanish or guerrilla forces, and was disbanded on August 5, 1898.
Meanwhile, attention soon turned to other areas of the bay. The Spanish were expanding their earthworks on Cayo del Toro, where they had three 160-mm bronze cannons and a modern 89-mm Krupp cannon . At Caimanera, on the cliff south of the village, three more 6.4-inch (160 mm) cannons were mounted, and the small gunboat Sandoval had a battery of a six-pounder and a one-pounder Maxim automatic cannon .
Admiral Sampson decided to bombard the fort at Cayo del Toro and on June 16 sent the USS Texas and Yankee to join the USS Marblehead in this plan. The fire from the three ships temporarily dismantled two of the enemy's large guns, destroyed buildings on the Cay and drove troops from all the guns and trenches. Their combined firepower had reduced the Spanish fort to impotence within 15 minutes of the initial attack. An enemy shell landed near the bow of the Marblehead, sinking less than ten yards from the ship, but no hits were recorded.
As the Americans proceeded slowly, a lookout on Marblehead reported that the starboard propeller was fouled by a buoy. The engine was shut down and the propeller was freed from the "buoy," which turned out to be a contact mine . The mine was successfully disarmed. It was later learned that the ships had passed through a field of 18 such mines, or torpedoes, on the voyage to the bay and through the same field on the return voyage, without damage of any kind. A few days after the attack on Cayo del Toro, the minefield was thoroughly explored and 14 mines were recovered. Their failure to explode on contact was attributed to mechanical failure, as well as healthy barnacle growth on the contact levers.
The dredging operation , carried out without specialized equipment, involved two steam lances and two whalers from Marblehead and Dolphin . One lance and one whaler side by side, connected to the other lance and whaler by a rope with a drag chain in the middle, swept the channel. When the drag met an obstacle, the boats joined together and crossed the ends of the drag. The boats were then carefully hoisted up to the mine, which was brought to the surface and disarmed. Twice the resistance brought up two mines together.
While searching for mines, boats had been struck from Hicacal Beach , where 250 Spanish infantrymen had been posted to guard the minefield. He was determined to rout the last remaining enemy force in the vicinity of the bay, and on June 25 Lt. Col. Huntington led two companies of marines and 40 Cubans in an amphibious assault on Hicacal Beach. It proved to be a bloodless encounter, since the Spaniards had left a day or two earlier.
With Guantanamo Bay successfully occupied, U.S. interest focused on operations in Santiago. A U.S. expeditionary force of 17,000 officers and men under the command of Major General William R. Shafter was landed east of the city at the small ports of Daiquirí and Siboney between June 22 and 25, unopposed. A week later, on July 1, the historic battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill ended in victory for U.S. forces, opening the door to Santiago itself. On the morning of July 3, a request was sent to the Spanish commander, General Arsenio Linares , to surrender or suffer a bombardment of the city as an alternative. That same morning, the Spanish fleet under Admiral Pascual Cervera sailed out of Santiago Bay, only to meet complete destruction at the hands of the U.S. fleet. The great Spanish resistance in Santiago was at an end, although it was not until July 15 that a preliminary agreement was signed. U.S. forces occupied the city on July 17.
The 7,000 Spanish troops in the town of Guantanamo-a mere 64 kilometers (40 miles)-did not march to the aid of the besieged army of Linares, because prior to the cutting off of its communications, General Pareja had been ordered by his superiors to hold the town of Guantanamoat all costs. This was ordered because the Spanish feared that the Guantanamo Valley could be used as an invasion route by U.S. forces, since the British had once used it to advance on Santiago. After the Navy cut the cables and established a base at Guantanamo Bay, General Pareja remained in complete ignorance of the course of the war because the Cuban insurgents maintained such a tight ring around the city that no messenger could get through their lines. Fifteen were captured and executed as spies. None of General Linares' frantic pleas for help reached Pareja.
The threat posed by U.S. naval forces and a battalion of marines at Guantanamo Bay, in addition to the stranglehold on land communications by 1,000 Cuban rebels, effectively stopped a 7,000-man army that could have changed the outcome of the fighting in Santiago. Less than a week after Santiago's surrender, the Guantanamo Bay base was used to launch the invasion of Puerto Rico, 500 miles (800 km) to the east. Three thousand five hundred troops under General Miles sailed from the bay on July 21. This was the last major event in the Guantanamo Bay phase of the Spanish-American War; on August 12 the war ended with the signing of the peace protocol and armistice. The new U.S. naval base was not formalized by the lease between the United States and Cuba until five years later, when it was acquired as a "coal and naval station" in 1903, but its value was already proven.
Lieutenant Colonel Huntington's First Marine Battalion, which had returned aboard the USS Resolute during the siege and surrender of Santiago, sailed for the United States and, after a stop in New York, arrived at Portsmouth Harbor , disembarking its marines on the evening of August 24, 1898.
On July 1 at dawn U.S. troops attacked the Spaniards stationed at El Caney and Fort El Viso with 6653 men against 520 Spaniards, supported by an unknown number of Cuban loyalist guerrillas. The battle lasted until 5 p.m. with heavy losses on both the U.S. and Spanish sides; among other things, the Spaniards also lost the commander of their forces (Gen. Vara de Rey).
While fighting at El Caney, about 8:20 a.m. the Americans also attacked the San Juan Hills so that the area commander (Gen. Linares) could not send reinforcements to the nearby El Caney position. A fortuitous discovery of a new path fording the Aguadores River allowed the Americans to relieve the traffic jam that was forming at the foot of the San Juan Hill, but the lead regiment was forced to retreat in disorder by Spanish fire, however, the reserve brigade managed to close in on the Spaniards until about 500 m, where the brigade commander (Col. Wikoff) was killed and his deputies (Lt. Col. Worth and Lt. Col. Liscum) seriously wounded, so command of the brigade was taken over by t. Col. Ewers. The battle continued with mixed fortunes until the exhausted Spaniards abandoned San Juan Hill at 1:30 p.m. At that point began the assault on Kettle Hill, carried out by the 1st Cavalry, 9th Cavalry, Rough Riders, and part of the 3rd Cavalry led by future President Theodore Roosevelt, and Lt. Col. Sumner, which ended about the same time. The battle continued until sunset, but the Spaniards failed to regain their lost positions, losing among other things their commander (Gen. Linares), who was wounded in the arm. Total American losses at El Caney and in the San Juan Hills were more than 1,000 dead and wounded.
After these events of arms, the Americans remained stationary in front of Santiago, waiting for the garrison to starve to surrender, an event that occurred on July 16; the city's garrison still obtained the honor of arms. However, after Santiago's surrender, the Americans, who remained there until the conclusion of the war, were decimated by malarial fever, yellow fever and typhoid fever.
On July 3 Cervera's squadron attempted to force the blockade, but was destroyed in about two hours by Commodore Schley (Sampson was ashore talking to General Shafter); Spain lost four cruisers and two destroyers.
Meanwhile, Camara's squadron (Reserve Squadron) had departed from Cadiz on June 16, still leaving the Alfonso XIII and Numancia behind, passing Pantelleria on June 20, and had entered Suez on July 6, having passed through the channel of the same name, presumably to make the U.S. believe it was headed for the Philippines, then returning to Cadiz on July 29.
