Summary

The Battle of Gaugamela (Ancient Greek: Γαυγάμηλα, Gaugámēla) also known as the Battle of Arbela, was fought by Alexander the Great against the Achaemenid empire of Darius III. On October 1, 331 BC, the army of the Corinthian League under the command of the Macedonian king clashed with the Persian army of Darius III near Gaugamela, near the present-day city of Mosul in Iraq. Although heavily outnumbered, Alexander emerged victorious due to his superior tactics and a better-trained army. It was a decisive victory for the Hellenic alliance and led to the fall of the Achaemenid empire.

The two main sources on the battle of Gaugamela are the works of Arrian (less important are the works of Diodorus Siculus (Historical Library) and Plutarch (Life of Alexander). All of these historians lived several centuries after Alexander's expedition to Asia: Diodorus in the first century B.C.E., Arrian and Plutarch between the first and second centuries A.D., and Rufus, who perhaps wrote in the third century A.D. It is clear how these historians derived their narratives from other sources coeval with Alexander's period, but these are now largely lost.

One of the earliest books in ancient Greek is that of Callisthenes of Olinthus. (Other contemporary works, however, with an overtly encomiastic character, are the History of Alexander of at least two books, by Anaximenes of Lampsacus and the work of Onesicritus (uncertain title) who was a helmsman in the service of Alexander.

From these early works follow the writings of Nearchus (late 4th century BCE) and Aristobulus (3rd century BCE), which will be the primary source for Arrian's work. The work of Clitarchus of Alexandria (around 310 BCE), in twelve books, will be variously used by Diodorus and Rufus. All of these works have a pro-Macedonian character, excluding the work of Hieronymus of Cardia (3rd century B.C.), who, while favoring a narrative system of exaggeration and aimed at astonishing the reader, nevertheless remains rather detached from the biased narrative of the other historians. It is therefore very difficult to succeed in giving a faithful reconstruction of the events, the number of soldiers and the losses of the battle, which are greatly affected by the partial filter given by ancient historians.

In November 333 BCE, Darius III had been defeated by Alexander at the Battle of Issus resulting in the capture of his wife, his mother, and his two daughters, Statira II and Dripetides. The Persian emperor then retreated to Babylon, where he reorganized the surviving army from the previous battle. Instead, the victory at Issus gave Alexander control of southern Asia Minor. Following his victory in the siege of Tyre, which had lasted from January to July, Alexander subsequently gained control of the Levant as well. After his victory at Gaza, the number of Persian troops still able to fight shrank to the point that the Persian satrap of Egypt, Mazaces, preferred to surrender peacefully to Alexander.

The negotiations between Darius and Alexander

Darius tried to diplomatically dissuade Alexander from launching further attacks against his empire. Ancient historians offer several accounts of his negotiations with the Macedonian, which can be summarized as three attempts at negotiation.

The historians Justin, Arrian, and Quintus Curtius Rufus report that Darius sent a letter to Alexander after the battle of Issus. In the letter he asked him to withdraw from Asia and release his prisoners. According to Curtius and Justin, the Persian emperor offered a ransom for his prisoners, while Arrian makes no mention of any ransom. Curtius describes the tone of the letter as offensive. Alexander rejected his claims.

A second attempt at negotiation took place after the capture of Tyre. Darius offered Alexander a marriage to his daughter Statira and all the territory west of the Halys River. Justin is less precise and, without mentioning a particular daughter, speaks of an unspecified portion of Darius' kingdom. Diodorus Siculus also mentions the offer of all the territory west of the Halys River, as well as those of a treaty of friendship and a large ransom for the captives. Diodorus is the only ancient historian to report that Alexander hid this letter and presented his friends and advisers with a forged letter more favorable to his interests of continuing the war. Once again Alexander rejected any agreement, sending the Persian ambassadors back empty-handed.

After the failure of the second negotiation attempt, Darius began to prepare for another battle. However, he made a third and final negotiating effort after Alexander's departure from Egypt. The third offer Darius made was much more generous this time. He praised and thanked Alexander for his treatment of his mother Sisygambis and offered him all the territory west of the Euphrates, the co-domination of the Achaemenid Empire, the hand of one of his daughters and 30,000 talents of silver. In Diodorus' account, Alexander submitted this offer to his friends. Parmenion was the only one to take the floor, saying, "If I were Alexander, I should accept what was offered and make a treaty." To which Alexander apparently replied, "Then I should, if I were Parmenion." Alexander again refused Darius' offer, arguing that there could be only one king of Asia. He invited Darius to surrender to him or meet him in battle to decide who should be the one king of Asia.

The descriptions provided by other historians regarding the third negotiation attempt are similar to Diodorus' account but differ in detail. Diodorus, Curtius, and Arrian write that an embassy was sent and not a letter, as claimed by Justin and Plutarch. Plutarch and Arrian report that the ransom offered for the prisoners was 10,000 talents, but Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin give a figure of 30,000. Arrian writes that this third attempt took place during the siege of Tyre, where other historians place the second attempt at negotiation. With the failure of diplomacy, Darius decided to prepare for another battle against Alexander.

In the two years following the Battle of Issus Alexander had occupied the Mediterranean coast from Phoenicia to Egypt, where he had himself anointed pharaoh.

After settling the administration in Egypt, Alexander had returned to Tyre during the spring of 331 BCE. He had then advanced from Syria to the central part of the Persian Empire, thus reaching Tapsacus in July or August 331 BCE. Arrian reports that Darius had placed satrap Mazeus to guard the ford on the Euphrates near Tapsacus with a force of 3,000 cavalry, including 2,000 Greek mercenaries. These fled at the approach of Alexander's army, which then managed to cross the river without encountering any opposition.

Alexander's march through Mesopotamia

Once over the river there were two possible routes through Mesopotamia: one led directly to Babylon, while the other led first north and then, once over the hills, back south reaching the same destination.

Darius' idea was to force his opponent to join him on the plains he had chosen for the confrontation. There he would be able to exploit his numerical superiority, in the meantime inducing Alexander not to take the direct route to Babylon, which would have caused the battle to be avoided. Part of the Persian army was therefore sent to the area to prevent the Macedonians from building a bridge while Mazeus, with a few thousand men, was to prevent Alexander's army from taking the wrong route.

After crossing the Euphrates River Alexander nevertheless followed the northern route, instead of the southeastward route that would have taken him directly to Babylon. In doing so, he kept the course of the Euphrates and the mountains of Armenia to his left. The northern route would in fact have made it easier to obtain forage and provisions and was not characterized by the extreme heat of the direct route. When some Persian scouts were captured, they reported to the Macedonians that Darius had encamped in front of the Tigris River, with an even larger army than he had faced in Cilicia, to prevent Alexander from crossing it. In fact the Macedonian found the Tigris undefended and managed to cross it though with great difficulty.

Diodorus gives a different account, stating that Mazeo was only to prevent Alexander from crossing the Tigris. However, Mazeo would not have bothered to defend it because he considered it impassable due to the strong current and depth of the river. Moreover, Diodorus and Curtius Rufus recall that Mazeo employed the tactic of scorched earth in the region where Alexander's army was to pass, so as to prevent food supplies to the Macedonians. He burned fields and towns for this but supplies were still possible by using the river course for quick transportation.

After the Macedonian army had crossed the Tigris, a lunar eclipse occurred. Alexander then offered a sacrifice to the Moon, Sun and Earth.

This detail is very important in determining the date of the battle that was fought shortly thereafter. According to the list of lunar eclipses of the 4th century BC, it should correspond with that of October 1, 331 BC. In fact, the discussion has never been closed, and the tradition regarding the precise date of the battle is confused. Plutarch places it eleven days earlier because he refers to another eclipse that occurred in the Attic month of Boedromion, which was the name of the third month of the Attic calendar, and therefore identified as that of the 20th

The lunar eclipse was considered in any case an omen favorable to the Macedonians and Alexander. The latter then decided to attack the opposing army, fearing that by stalling any longer Darius might take refuge in lands more hostile to him.

Alexander marched south along the eastern bank of the Tigris. On the fourth day after crossing the Tigris his scouts reported that Persian cavalry had been sighted; they could not give an exact numbering but still estimated it at more than a thousand men. Alexander decided to attack them with his cavalry force, leaving the rest of his army behind. At the sight of the Macedonian king the Persian cavalry fled. Most of it managed to get to safety, but some were killed or taken prisoner. These reported to the Macedonians that Darius was not far away, and his camp was located near Gaugamela.

Strategic Analysis

Several historians have criticized the Persians for their failure to undermine Alexander's army and especially to disrupt his long supply lines during the advance through Mesopotamia. British historian Peter Green believes that Alexander's choice to move on the northern route caught the Persians off guard. According to Green, Darius expected Alexander to take the faster route south that pointed directly toward Babylon, as Cyrus the Younger had already done in 401 B.C., before his defeat at the Battle of Cunassa. Darius' use of scorched earth tactics and hawked chariots suggests that he wanted to repeat that battle. Alexander would not have been able to adequately supply his army if he had taken the southern route, even if the scorched earth tactic had failed. The Macedonian army, undernourished and exhausted by the heat, would then have been easily defeated by Darius on the plain of Cunassa. When Alexander took the northern route, Mazeus had to return to Babylon to carry the news. Darius then probably decided to see to it that Alexander did not cross the Tigris. This plan probably failed because the Macedonian used a ford on the river that was closer to Tapsacus than to Babylon. Darius would then improvise and chose Gaugamela as the place most favorable to him for a battle. The Dutch historian Jona Lendering, in his book "Alexander de Grote. De ondergang van het Perzische rijk" ("Alexander the Great. The End of the Persian Empire") argues otherwise and praises Mazeus and Darius for their strategy: Darius would deliberately allow Alexander to cross the rivers unchallenged to guide him to his chosen battlefield.

Size of the Persian army

Some ancient Greek historians testify that the Persian army numbered between 200,000 and 300,000 men, but some modern scholars suggest that it actually did not exceed 50,000 because of the logistical difficulties at the time in fielding more than 50,000 soldiers in battle. However, it is not excluded that the Achaemenid empire could have fielded more than 100,000 men on that occasion. The figures given by different sources, are among the most varied. One estimate reports that there were 25,000 Peltasts, 2,000 Greek Hoplites, and 40,000 cavalry, and 15 war elephants. Hans Delbrück estimates the Persian cavalry at a maximum number of 12,000 because of the management problems of the time, and the Persian infantry (Peltasti) at a lower number than the Greek heavy infantry, but offset by 8,000 Greek mercenaries.

Warry estimates a total size of the Persian army at about 91,000; Welman 90,000; Delbrück (Engels (1920) and Green (1990) around 100,000.

The exact number of Persians remains unknown but it is reasonably certain that they greatly outnumbered Alexander's forces. The most conservative ancient estimates report a number of 235,000 total. Other commentators believe Darius mustered about 500,000 men; some even consider his army to be one million strong.

The problem is bound to remain unsolved, at least with the documentary sources we have available to date. It should not be forgotten that we have only the accounts written by the victors. These are works written after the events mentioned here by historians (Ptolemy, Eumene of Cardia, the Bematists) who lived in a Hellenistic world that had by then mythologized Alexander as its founding hero. It is likely that some of these may have inflated the numbers in favor of the Persians to make the Macedonian's victory more admirable.

According to Arrian, Darius' force numbered 40,000 horsemen, 1,000,000 infantrymen, among whom he mentions a few thousand Greek mercenary hoplites without specifying their numbers, 200 Scythian falcate chariots and 15 war elephants from the Indian allies. Diodorus Siculus writes of 200,000 horsemen and 800,000 infantrymen. Plutarch attests to a total number of 1,000,000 troops but without specifying their composition, while according to Curtius Rufus it consisted of 45,000 horsemen and 200,000 infantrymen

Although it is certain that Darius had a significant advantage in numbers in any case, most of his troops were certainly of much lower quality than Alexander's. Alexander's pezeteri were armed with six-meter pikes, the famous and deadly sarissa. By contrast, the bulk of the Persian infantry was poorly trained and equipped compared to the Greek pezeteri and hoplites. Darius' only respectable infantry were precisely his 2,000 Greek hoplites and his personal bodyguard, the 10,000 Immortals.

The Greek mercenaries fought in the famous phalanx formation, armed with a heavy shield but with spears no longer than 3 meters, while the Immortals' spears were 2 meters long. Among the other Persian troops, the most heavily armed were the Armenians who were equipped in the Greek manner, and probably fought in the phalanx formation. The rest of Darius' contingents were much more lightly armed; historically the main weapons of the Achaemenid army were the bow and arrow, and the javelin.

Size of the Macedonian army

Alexander commanded the Greek forces of his kingdom of Macedonia and those of the League of Corinth along with his Thracian and Thessalian allies. According to Arrian, the most reliable historian (who is believed to have written based on the work of eyewitness Ptolemy) his forces numbered 7,000 horsemen and 40,000 foot soldiers. Modern estimates are based on Arrian's accounts. Many historians agree that the Macedonian army numbered 31,000 heavy infantrymen, including mercenaries and hoplites from other allied Greek states held in reserve, with an additional 9,000 light infantrymen consisting mainly of peltasts and some archers. The size of the Greek mounted division was about 7,000 men.

Darius chose an open and very regular plain, where he could comfortably deploy his large number of forces without risking being trapped in a narrow battlefield as had happened at Issus two years earlier: he would then be able to position the wards of his huge army across the full breadth of the terrain and effectively deploy his cavalry, which was much more numerous than the enemy's. According to some accounts, Darius ordered his soldiers to further level the ground before the battle, so as to ensure the best conditions for his 200 war chariots to move. However, this would not have been necessary. For there were already originally few low hills on the ground and, because of a very mild and dry autumn, even fewer bodies of water that Alexander could have used for protection.

The site of the battle has not been identified with certainty. The clash was probably fought near a hill shaped like camel humps, hence the etymology of the name: Tel Gomel (or Tel Gahmal) or Camel Mountain in Hebrew. Others translate the name as Camel Stable (Plutarch refers to it as Camel House in his Life of Alexander) and associate the place with a settlement. The most commonly accepted hypothesis regarding the correct location of the site is 36°21′36″N 43°15′00″E

After the battle Darius fled to Arbela (today's Arbil), located about 100-120 kilometers to the east, convinced that he could still organize a resistance that now appeared desperate even in the eyes of his most loyal generals.

The initial arrangements

The battle began with the Persians already present on the battlefield. Darius had recruited the best cavalry from his satrapies and allies from the Scythian tribes. He deployed Scythian war chariots, and to aid their movements he had the ground prepared in front of his troops (shrubs and bushes were removed and depressions filled in). Darius also had 15 Indian war elephants in his army (although it seems that these ultimately played no role in the battle.

Darius stood in the middle of his army surrounded by the best troops, as was the tradition of the Persian kings. To his right stood the Carii horsemen, the Greek Mercenaries and the Persian Horse Guards. Between the center and the right wing of the array he arranged the Persian Foot Guards (known as Immortals), the Indian Cavalry and the Mardian archers.

The cavalry was deployed on both wings. Bessus commanded the left wing, in which were the Battrian, Dahai, Arachrosian, Persian, Susi, Cadusian and Scythian horsemen. Chariots were positioned in front of these with a small group of Battrians. Mazeo commanded the right wing, which consisted of the Syrian, Median, Mesopotamian, Parthian, Saci, Tapuri, Hircan, Albanian, Sacesinian, Cappadocian and Armenian horsemen. The Cappadocians and Armenians were deployed in front of the other cavalry units and led the attack. The Albanians and Sacesini horsemen were given orders to spread out to strike the Macedonians' left flank.

The Macedonian array consisted of two parts: the right of the army under Alexander's direct command and the left entrusted to Parmenion. Alexander fought with his trusted Aetherian horsemen, accompanied by the Peons and the Macedonian light cavalry. The mercenary cavalry was divided into two groups, with the veterans arranged on the right flank and the others in front of the Agrians and the Macedonian archers, who were situated alongside the phalanx. Parmenion was positioned on the left with the Thessalians, Greek mercenaries and Thracian cavalry units. They were placed in that position with orders to carry out a containment maneuver while Alexander would deal the decisive blow from the right.

Between the center and the right wing of the formation were Cretan mercenaries. Behind them was a group of Thessalian horsemen commanded by Philip, son of Menelaus, and Achaean mercenaries. To their right was another part of the allied Greek cavalry. From there moved the phalanx, which was arranged in a double line. Since the numerical ratio between the opposing cavalries was 5 to 1 and the line formed by the Persians exceeded that of the phalanx by more than a mile, it seemed inevitable that the Macedonians would be outflanked on the flanks by the Persians. The second line had precisely the order to fight against any enemy units that flanked them. This second line consisted mainly of mercenaries.

The beginning of the battle

Alexander began the maneuvers by ordering his infantry to march in phalanx formation toward the center of the enemy line. The Macedonian advanced while keeping his wings staggered backward to induce the Persian cavalry to attack. While the phalanxes fought the Persian infantry, Darius sent a large part of his cavalry and some of his regular infantrymen to attack Parmenion's forces on the left.

Alexander adopted a very particular strategy that has been imitated very few times in history. His plan was to draw as much of the Persian cavalry as possible to the flanks in order to create a gap between the enemy lines, through which a decisive attack in the center could be launched against Darius. This required nothing short of perfect timing and maneuvering skills, and would only work if the Great King attacked in force first. Continuing to advance with wings staggered and arranged to form a 45-degree backward angle, the Macedonians at the same time slowly moved to the right. Alexander urged the Persian army to attack (since they would soon come out of the ground prepared for the encounter) even though Darius did not want to be the first to do so, having seen what had happened at Issus against a similar formation. In the end, however, Darius was forced to attack.

The Persian attack with falcate chariots

Darius launched his chariots, some of which were intercepted by the Agrians. Apparently the Macedonian army had been trained in a new tactic to counter the devastating attack of the chariots should they succeed in penetrating their ranks. The front lines were to move sideways opening a gap. The enemy horse would have refused to crash into the lances of the more advanced ranks and would have entered the trap, where the lances of the second lines would have stopped it. Thus the coachmen would have been killed with ease. In fact, the Macedonians succeeded in stopping the chariot attack.

Alexander's decisive attack

As the Persians pressed on with their attack on the Macedonians' flanks, Alexander slowly slipped into their rear guard. The Persians followed him in this maneuver until, at last, a gap opened up between Bessus' left wing and Darius' center, just as the Macedonian king had thrown his last mounted reserves into the fray. Alexander gave orders to his personal cavalry to disengage and prepare for the decisive attack against the Persians. Continuing to march he arranged his units as if to form a huge arrow, the tip of which was himself. Behind him he had his own personal cavalry and all the battalions of the phalanx that he managed to take from the battle. Still further behind were light auxiliary troops deployed.

This "great arrow" attacked the Persians in the center, just where they were most depleted, knocking out Darius' royal guard and Greek mercenaries. Bessus, on the left, found himself separated from Darius and, fearing that he too would be attacked by that enemy formation, began to withdraw his troops. Darius was also in danger of being isolated. At this point the various sources differ as to what happened. The most widely held view is that Darius retreated and the rest of the army followed him. But the only contemporary source known to us, a Babylonian astronomical journal written during the days of the battle, says:

Diodorus agrees with this version, confirming its validity: it would seem the most likely account of the battle.

The left flank relief

At that point, however, Alexander could not pursue Darius as he received a desperate plea for help from Parmenion (an event that would later be used by Callisthenes and others to discredit Parmenion).

As the Macedonians tried to plug the offensive on the left flank, a gap also opened in their lines between the left wing and the center. Persian and Indian cavalry units, positioned in the center with Darius, broke through. Instead of attacking Parmenion's phalanx from behind these proceeded toward the Macedonian camp to raid it. On their way back they clashed with Alexander's personal cavalry, which resulted in the deaths of more than 60 Macedonian horsemen.

After Darius, center, withdrew from the battle, Mazeus also began to withdraw his forces as Bessus was already doing. Unlike the latter, however, Mazeus and his troops became divided and as they fled they suffered a charge by Thessalians and other Macedonian cavalry units. Mazeo finally retreated to Babylon where he subsequently surrendered to the invaders.

After the battle Parmenion surrounded the Persian royal caravan while Alexander and his personal guard pursued Darius in hopes of capturing him. As at Issus, after the battle, the Macedonians seized a large booty, looting some 4,000 talents, as well as Darius' personal chariot and bow. War elephants were also captured.

Darius managed to escape the battle with a small core of his forces still intact. Bessus and the Battrian horsemen managed to rejoin him as did some survivors of the royal guard and 2,000 Greek mercenaries. At the end of the battle the Macedonians counted more than 1,200 dead and wounded in their ranks; losses among the Persians were about 53,000 men.

None

Darius in the course of his escape rallied what was left of his men. He planned to head even further east and raise a new army to face Alexander again, while the latter and his soldiers headed for Babylon. At the same time he sent letters to his eastern satrapies asking them to remain loyal to him.

Sources

1. Battle of Gaugamela
2. Battaglia di Gaugamela
3. ^ a b Non tutti gli studiosi sono concordi con tale data: alcuni citano quella del 30 settembre. Si veda ad esempio Plutarco, Alessandro Cesare, pag 113, BUR, 23ª edizione, 2009, ISBN 978-88-17-16613-3.
4. ^ Bosworth, p. 403.
5. ^ 100 infantry and 1,000 cavalry according to Arrian, 300 infantry according to Curtius Rufus, and 500 infantry according to Diodorus Siculus
6. ^ 40,000 according to Curtius Rufus and 90,000 according to Diodorus Siculus.
7. Arrianos 3.8, Plutarkhos 31.3
8. Jalkaväen määrä on hävinnyt nykypäivään säilyneistä lähteistä. 1 000 on arvio. (Hammond s.133)
9. a b c Arrianos 3.7
10. Diodoros 17.53.1, Arrianos 3.8
11. Plutarkhos 31.4, Arrianos 3.7
12. . Ο Martijn Moerbeek εκτιμά τον ελληνικό στρατό σε 31.000 φαλαγγίτες και 9.000 ελαφρύ πεζικό.
13. Ο John G. Warry υπολογίζει το συνολικό μέγεθος σε 91.000 άνδρες, ο Nick Welman σε 90.000, ο Hans Delbrück σε 52.000, ο Thomas Harbottle σε 120.000, ενώ ο Donald W. Engels και ο Peter Green όχι σε περισσότερους από 100.000 άνδρες.