Summary

The Battle of Cannae on August 2, 216 B.C. was one of the major battles of the Second Punic War and took place near the city of Canne in ancient Apulia. The army of Carthage, commanded with extreme skill by Hannibal, encircled and almost completely destroyed a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic, led by consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It was, in terms of combat casualties, one of the heaviest defeats suffered by Rome, second only to the Battle of Arausium, and is regarded as one of the greatest tactical maneuvers in military history.

Reorganized after earlier defeats at the battles of the Trebbia (218 B.C.) and Lake Trasimeno (217 B.C.), the Romans decided to face Hannibal at Cannae with about 86,000 Roman and allied troops. The Romans massed their heavy infantry in a tighter formation than usual, while Hannibal used the tactic of pincer maneuver. This maneuver proved so effective that the Roman army was annihilated as a fighting force. Following the Battle of Cannae, the city of Capua, once an ally of Rome, and other city-states changed alliances, siding with Carthage.

Shortly after the start of the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian general Hannibal arrived in Italy, crossing the Alps during the winter. He quickly won two important battles against the Romans: the Battle of the Trebbia and the Battle of Lake Trasimeno, preceded by a victory over the Romans in a lesser battle, the Battle of Ticino. Especially the defeat at Lake Trasimeno, in which the Roman army was almost annihilated, made Rome tremble; after suffering these defeats, the Romans appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator to deal with the threat. Fabio, aware of his adversary's superior military capabilities, adopted attrition tactics to deal with Hannibal, intercepting his supply routes and avoiding engaging in pitched battle; from this behavior derived his nickname "Temporeggiatore" (Cunctator), intended in a highly derogatory sense by the Romans, who would have wanted an offensive stance to avenge previous defeats as soon as possible.

As soon as the people and the Roman political leadership had overcome the political-moral crisis caused by Hannibal's initial victories, the wisdom of Fabius' strategy, which seemed sterile and passive and had apparently only favored the consolidation and strengthening of the Carthaginian army in the occupied Italic territory, was called into question. Fabius' strategy was particularly frustrating to most Romans, who were eager to conclude the war quickly and victoriously. There was also widespread fear that, if Hannibal continued unchallenged to plunder Italy, Rome's allies might doubt the Republic's military might and its ability to protect them from the devastating Carthaginian advance.

Dissatisfied with Fabius' strategy, the Roman Senate did not renew its dictatorial powers at the end of his term, and the command was temporarily assigned to consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus, who decided for the time being to continue the war with a wait-and-see tactic. In 216 B.C., in new elections, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro were elected consuls; the latter, according to Livy and Polybius, was intent on resuming, unlike the cautious Aemilius Paulus, an aggressive strategy to force Hannibal into a decisive battle. They were given command of an army of unprecedented size, with the aim of defeating the Carthaginian leader definitively.

The consul Varro is presented by ancient sources as reckless and arrogant, determined to defeat Hannibal in the open field. In contrast, the sources present the other consul, Aemilius Paulus, as cautious and wary, doubtful about the advisability of fighting a pitched battle on open and level ground, despite the numerical strength of the legions. The consul's doubts must have been particularly well-founded, as Hannibal had cavalry superior to that of the Romans, both in quality and numbers.

Hannibal, for his part, was aware of his growing logistical and supply difficulties and of the risk of attrition of his troops and prestige in Italy, as well as in the mother country, in the event of a grueling positional war; he believed that a new major pitched battle was necessary to inflict a decisive defeat on the Romans, by which he would finally achieve the breakdown of the republic's resilience and its system of alliances.

The account of the antecedents of the battle of Cannae differs substantially in the main ancient sources; while Polybius, considered by Gaetano De Sanctis to be far more reliable, narrates the events succinctly and clearly, Livy in his narrative, in which De Sanctis sees contaminations of the tendentious annalist Valerius Anziate, enriches the unfolding of the events with some dubious episodes, full of fanciful details aimed at exaggerating Hannibal's contingent difficulties and emphasizing the discernment as a leader of Aemilius Paulus.

Polybius recounts that Hannibal, even before the arrival of the new consuls, moved with his troops from Geronius and, judging it advantageous to force his enemies to fight at any cost, seized the fortress of the city named Cannae, in a strategic position with respect to all the surrounding territory. In this the Romans had collected grain and other provisions from the territory of Canusio, and from here they brought them to the Roman camp near Geronius as the need arose. According to various writers of the imperial era (I-II centuries CE), the fortress of Canne was located in Regio II Apulia et Calabria, near the river Aufidus (Hannibal thus stood between the Romans and their main sources of supply. As Polybius points out, the capture of Cannae "caused great havoc to the Roman army, for it was not only the loss of the post and supplies in it that distressed them, but the fact that it dominated the surrounding district." The new consuls, having decided to confront Hannibal, marched south in search of the Carthaginian general.

Titus Livy, on the other hand, describes how Hannibal, besieging the small Apulian city of Geronius, found himself in difficulty: his army's provisions were sufficient for less than ten days, and some contingents of Iberians were contemplating desertion; the Roman army would also inflict a local defeat on him. When both armies, the Roman and the Carthaginian, were encamped near Geronius, Hannibal would also set a trap for the Romans, which would be foiled mainly by the sagacity of Aemilius Paulus, in contrast to the recklessness of Varro.

At night, Hannibal would pretend to abandon his camp, which was full of booty, and hide his army behind high ground, ready for ambush, with the intention of hurling himself at the enemy when he began to loot the apparently abandoned camp. He would leave many fires burning in the camp, as if to make the consuls believe that the camp was still occupied, in a deception similar to the one he used with Fabius Maximus the previous year. When it was daylight, the Romans soon realized that the camp had been abandoned, and the legionaries forcefully requested the consuls to order them to pursue the enemies and sack the camp. Varro would also have been of this opinion.

Aemilius Paulus, more prudent, sent out to scout the prefect Marcus Statilius with a squadron of Lucanians. He, after entering the camp, reported that it was certainly a trap: fires had been left burning on the side facing the Romans, tents were open and all the most valuable things left in sight. This tale, however, would have exalted the legionaries' desire for booty, and Varro would have given the signal to penetrate the camp. Aemilius Paulus, doubtful and hesitant, had unfavorable auspices from the sacred fowls, however, and communicated this to Varro, who was intimidated. At first the troops did not obey the command to return to the camp, but two servants, who had been captured earlier by the Numids and had now escaped from captivity, would return at that very moment, reporting that Hannibal's army was lying in wait. Their timely arrival would have restored authority to the consuls; however, Livy notes tendentiously that by then Varro's "mistaken surrender" ("prava indulgentia") "had weakened his authority with the soldiers" (primum apud eos

Titus Livy concludes his narrative of the antecedents by describing a Hannibal in a desperate situation, ready to fall back to Gaul, abandoning the bulk of his army, and very concerned about possible extensive defections among his troops. De Sanctis, however, gives no credence to the episodes narrated by Livy; in particular, he calls the set of antecedents narrated by the Latin historian a "rambling tale" and the alleged stratagem of the abandoned camp "ridiculous and absurd"; according to him, Statilius is also a suspect character and invented by the annalists.

The chronology of events, on the other hand, according to Polybius' account is simple and clear: on the first day (July 27) the Romans set out from Geronius toward the location of the Carthaginians. Under the command of Aemilius Paulus, having arrived on the second day (July 28) within sight of the enemies, they encamped at the distance of about fifty stadia (about 9.25 km) On the next day (July 29) they broke camp by Varro's order and advanced toward the Carthaginians, but were attacked by Hannibal while on the march. Varro successfully repulsed the Carthaginian attack, and at the onset of night the opponents separated. This victory, actually a mere skirmish with no strategic value, greatly strengthened the confidence of the Roman army and would also reinforce Varro's confidence and aggressiveness.

On the following day (July 30), by order of Aemilius Paulus, the Romans built two encampments near the Aufidus River: the major one, occupied by two-thirds of the forces, on one bank of the river to the west, and the minor one, with one-third of the forces, on the other bank to the east of the ford. The purpose of this second encampment would have been to protect foraging actions from the main encampment and to hinder those of the enemy.

According to Polybius, the two armies remained in their respective positions for two days. During the second day (August 1), Hannibal, aware that Aemilius Paulus was at that time in command of the Roman army, left his camp and deployed his army for battle. Aemilius Paulus, however, did not want to enter combat. After the enemy had refused to enter the battle, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the Aufidus water for the Roman troops, sent his Numidian horsemen toward the smaller Roman camp to annoy the enemy and to damage the water supply. Related to this circumstance perhaps is the stratagem, not reported by Polybius, that Hannibal allegedly muddied the water to ruin the Romans' health or, even, had corpses thrown into it. hannibal's cavalry rode boldly to the limits of the smaller Roman camp, causing confusion and complete disruption of the water supply. The only reason that kept the Romans from immediately crossing the river and disposing themselves for battle would have been the fact that supreme command that day was in the hands of Aemilius Paulus. Thus, on the following day, Varro, without consulting his colleague, had the battle signal displayed and had the deployed troops cross the river, while Aemilius Paulus followed, as he could not help but go along with this decision.

Hannibal, despite the clear numerical superiority of the enemy, was absolutely eager to fight and, in spite of the fears and doubts expressed by some of his subordinates, showed confidence and imperturbability in the face of the imposing Roman array that was carefully positioning itself in front of his troops east of the river, where the minor Roman camp was, on the morning of August 2. In fact, according to Plutarch, to an astonished Carthaginian officer named Gisgo who had pointed out how exterminated the Roman army was, Hannibal is said to have replied wryly, "Another thing that has escaped you, Gisgo, is even more astonishing: that even though there are so many Romans, there is not a single one among them named Gisgo."

Data regarding the troops involved in ancient battles are often unreliable, and at Cannae this is no exception. So the following data should be treated with caution, especially those concerning the Carthaginian side.

Romans

Of these eight legions, about 40,000 Roman soldiers, including about 2,400 cavalry, formed the core of the new army. Since each legion was accompanied by an equal number of allied troops and the allied cavalry numbered about 4,000 men, the total strength of the army that would face Hannibal could not have been much less than 90,000 men. However, some authors have suggested that the destruction of an army of 90,000 men would have been impossible. They argue that Rome probably fielded 48,000 infantrymen and 6,000 cavalrymen against Hannibal's 35,000 infantrymen and 10,000 cavalrymen. Although no definitive Roman troop numbers exist, all sources agree that the Carthaginian army faced an opposing army having a large numerical superiority. The Roman legions had two-thirds of their numbers made up of recruits, the so-called tirones, but there were at least two legions made up of trained and experienced legionaries from the army of the 218 B.C.E. consul Publius Cornelius Scipio.

Each legion consisted of 4,200 infantrymen (raised to 5,000 in the case of particularly serious circumstances) and 300 cavalrymen. The allied units of socii (i.e., the Alae, since they were placed at the "wings" of the deployment), on the other hand, consisted of an equal number of infantrymen, but three times as many horsemen (900 per unit). The infantrymen were then divided into four different categories, based on social class

If the Roman army had not been so large, each of the two consuls would have commanded his own part of the army, but since the two armies were concentrated together, Roman law required alternating command on a daily basis. It is possible that Hannibal understood that the command of the Roman army alternated between the two consuls and planned his strategy accordingly. In the traditional account Varro held command on the day of the battle and he is said to have decided to face combat in the open field, despite Aemilius Paulus' advice to the contrary: much of the blame for the defeat has been attributed by ancient historians to the recklessness of the popular consul. However, controversy exists regarding who was actually in command on the day of the battle, as some scholars believe that Aemilius Paulus may have been the leader of the army that day.

A detailed list of the Italic cities and peoples who took part in the battle of Cannae is given in Book VIII of the poem The Punic ones by Silio Italico (Never was the itala terra shaken by greater storm of arms and horses, for they feared the ultimate fate of Rome and the people, nor did they have more hope of attempting after this another battle):

Carthaginians

The Carthaginian army consisted of about 10,000 cavalry, 40,000 heavy infantry, and 6,000 light infantry on the battlefield, excluding detachments. The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors recruited from different geographical areas. There were 22,000 Iberian and Celtic infantrymen flanked by two African heavy infantry corps in tactical reserve, consisting of a total of 10,000 Libyans. Cavalry also came from different regions. Hannibal had a cavalry consisting of 4,000 Numidians, 2,000 Iberians, 4,000 Gauls, and 450 Libyan-Phoenicians. Finally, Hannibal had about 8,000 light infantry warriors among Balearic slingers and lancers of mixed nationalities. Each of these different groups of warriors brought its specific military qualities to the Carthaginian deployment. The unifying factor in the Carthaginian army was the strong bond of loyalty and trust that each group had with Hannibal. Although the Carthaginians normally deployed elephants in battles to terrorize enemy horses and disrupt infantry, no elephants were present at the Battle of Cannae, as none of those who had departed from Iberia and managed to cross the Alps had survived.

The Carthaginian army used a wide variety of warfare equipment. Iberians fought with swords, javelins, and other types of spears. For defense, Iberian warriors carried large oval shields; Gaul soldiers were similarly equipped, and the typical weapon of these units was the sword. However, the types of swords found in the two peoples were different from each other: the Gauls had them very long and without a point, thus used for cutting blows; while the Hispanics, used to attack the enemy more by point than by cutting, short but handy, and pointed. Carthaginian heavy cavalry carried two javelins, a curved sword, and a heavy shield. Numidian cavalry had light equipment, sometimes even lacked bridles for their horses, and carried no armor at all, but only a small shield, javelins, and possibly a knife or longer cutting weapon. Shooters, as light infantry, carried either slingers or spears. The slingers of the Balearic Islands, famous for their accuracy in shooting, carried short, medium, or long slings, used for throwing stones or other types of projectiles. They may have carried a small shield or a simple layer of leather on their arms into battle, but this is uncertain.

The equipment of Libyan infantry lines has been much debated. Duncan Head wrote in favor of the use of short sharp spears. Polybius stated that the Libyans had fought with equipment taken from the previously defeated Romans. It is unclear whether he meant only shields and armor or also attack weapons. In addition to his description of the battle itself, Polybius wrote that "against Hannibal, the defeats suffered had nothing to do with weapons or formations: Hannibal himself discarded the equipment with which he had begun (and) armed his troops with Roman weapons." Gregory Daly is inclined to believe that the Libyan infantry copied the Iberian use of the sword during their fighting; also supporting the hypothesis that they were similarly armed to the Romans. Connolly, on the other hand, believed that these infantry were armed with long pikes. This hypothesis was challenged by Head because Plutarch stated that they carried shorter spears than the Roman triarii and by Daly because, leaning on Plutarch's statement, they could not have carried an unwieldy pike and at the same time a heavy shield like the Roman-style shield.

Romans

The traditional distribution of the armies of old consisted of placing infantry in the center and cavalry in two "wings" to the side. The Romans followed this convention quite faithfully; Terentius Varro was aware that the Roman infantry had succeeded in penetrating the center of Hannibal's army during the Battle of the Trebbia and was intent on repeating this maneuver of frontal attack in the center by employing a greater mass of legionaries. So in this battle he arranged the infantry lines by length rather than width and decreased the spaces between the maniples. He hoped in this way to penetrate more easily into the center of Hannibal's army lines by taking advantage of the heavy legionary infantry, which was able to exert irresistible pressure, thanks to its armament and deployment, in the event of a frontal collision.

As Polybius writes, Varro deployed the infantry by "arranging the maniples thicker than usual and making them much deeper than wide." Because of the decision to reduce the extent of the army, each legionary had only a meter of space on the sides and each maniple occupied a front line of only about 4.5 meters (15 feet). Each legion deployed on a front line of sixty men (each maniple deployed with five legionaries in front and thirty legionaries deep, and the entire attack front of the eight Roman and eight allied legions measured about 1,440 meters (1,440 yards) with a depth of a hundred meters (1,000 feet). In this formation the principes were stationed immediately behind the astati, ready to push forward at first contact to assure the Romans of a united front. It is assumed that the oblique front of the consular troops, in their entirety, thus including the cavalry, was as much as 3,000 meters long, oblique because the plain from north to south was not long enough to do otherwise.

Although they were outnumbered, the Carthaginians, because of the length distribution of the Roman army, had a front almost the same size as the enemy's. In addition, Aemilius Paulus and Varro adopted a tight and deeply reinforced cavalry formation with a deployment front of only 600 meters on the Roman right flank and about 1,700 meters on the left, the space reduced due to the characteristics of the terrain. The close deployment of the horsemen was intended by the two consuls to avoid rapid movements and to favor a close and prolonged fight, favorable to gain time while waiting for the success of the Roman legionaries in the center of the front.

Carthaginians

Fully aware of his superior tactical-strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the Roman leaders, Hannibal concocted a surprising and risky deployment and battle plan from which, however, if successful, he could expect decisive results on the battlefield. Having immediately realized the enemy's intentions and the lack of elasticity of his tight formation in preparation for a frontal attack, Hannibal planned to exploit these weaknesses in the Romans' system of warfare and employ his fewer but more experienced and more mobile troops in a complex pincer maneuver.

Hannibal had deployed his forces according to the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into account both their strengths and weaknesses in devising his strategy. He placed in the center of the deployment the contingents of Gaul allies, physically vigorous but almost unarmored fighters equipped with heavy swords, and Iberians, soldiers clad in short white tunics, fierce and well-armed, arranging them to form an arc stretched forward. The purpose of this particular arrangement was twofold: in this way, the Carthaginian leader hoped to draw the Roman attacking mass to the center, against the apparent exposed weak point of the Carthaginian array; furthermore, the arch arrangement would allow the Ibero-Gallian array, consisting of some 20,000 men, to gain time and room to maneuver to retreat under the foreseeable impact of the Roman attack without disintegrating. Falling back, but without losing cohesion, the Ibero-Gallians should, according to Hannibal's intentions, have forced the Roman legions into a kind of funnel with both sides uncovered where the Carthaginian leader planned to bring in his African heavy infantry (about 10. 000 men), made up of the most experienced fighters and armed with panoplies captured from the enemy; moreover, they could have been confused with Romans, since the same armor and shields had been of Romans who had been victims of previous battles. This infantry was deployed by Hannibal on the two sides in a position further back than the Ibero-Gallians' forward-extended bow, serving as a tactical reserve to be engaged only in the second phase of the battle. These infantrymen had been hardened by many battles, were cohesive, and would attack the Romans on the flanks. John Brizzi describes the ranks of the African infantry, made up of veteran warriors, violent and brutal, armed in part with weapons and armor taken from the Romans, looking impressive and fierce.

On the left flank Asdrubale was assigned about 6,500 Ibero-Gallic heavy cavalry, with the task, despite the limited space for maneuver available due to the presence of the river course, of quickly routing by shock and numerical superiority the weak Roman cavalry led by Consul Aemilius Paulus, and on the right flank he deployed instead the 4. 000 Numidians led by Maarbale, horsemen skilled in sudden maneuvers at speed, able to engage and neutralize the Italic cavalry under Varro's command. Hannibal foresaw that his cavalry, consisting essentially of half Ibero-Gallic horsemen and half Numidian light cavalry, and fighting alongside the infantry, should first defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and then rotate around the infantry by attacking the legionaries from behind. Thus, with Gallo-Iberian infantry in front, African heavy infantry on either side, and Iberian, Gallic, and Numidian cavalry behind, the maneuver of encirclement and annihilation would have been completed perfectly.

Troop distribution in the plain

The consuls Terentius Varro and Aemilius Paulus consciously chose to face the battle east of the Aufidus River, deploying their huge army to the north of the opposing forces, with a front to the south and the right flank in contact with the course of the river, and believed that they could minimize the superiority of the enemy cavalry and Hannibal's tactical skill precisely because of the configuration of the terrain. Varro and Paul believed that the numerically superior legionaries would press the Carthaginians hard until they pushed them into the river where, without room to maneuver, they would die in panic. Bearing in mind that Hannibal's two previous victories had been largely decided by his skill and cunning, Varro and Paul sought an uncovered battlefield free of pitfalls. The field of Cannae seemed to fit this need, as it lacked places to hide troops to ambush the enemy; moreover, the presence of some hills on the Romans' left flank should have prevented the agile maneuvers of the Numidian cavalry in this area as well and prevented deep outflanking maneuvers.

Hannibal was not concerned about his position near the Aufidus River; on the contrary, this factor was used by him to further his strategy. Because of the river, the Romans could not have performed a pincer maneuver around the Carthaginian army, as one of the flanks of Hannibal's army was deployed too close to the river. The Romans were hampered on their right flank by the Aufidus River, and so the left flank was the only viable route of retreat.

In addition, the Carthaginian forces would maneuver so that the Romans would have their faces to the south. In this way the morning sun would beat either side, very conveniently, sideways, and the Carthaginians' back wind would raise dust against the Romans' faces.

In any case, the extraordinary army deployment carried out by Hannibal, based on his analysis of the territory and his understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive.

Beginning of the battle

The battle began with a confrontation between the light infantry that preceded the real pitched battle between the bulk of the two armies; javelins, projectiles, and arrows were fired. Probably at this early stage the Velites had the advantage of numerical superiority and greater precision of fire. Hannibal decided from the beginning to launch the heavy cavalry commanded by Asdrubal against the Roman cavalry, using as protection a large cloud of dust that had probably been created, due to the march of the armies and the initial clash between light infantry, in the center of the battlefield.

The Ibero-Celtic heavy cavalry, deployed on the left flank then violently attacked the Roman cavalry, employing an unusual but well-prepared tactic not foreseen by the Romans; Asdrubal ordered a hand-to-hand charge. Polybius tells how the Hispanic and Celtic horsemen approached the battle on foot after dismounting from their horses in what he considers a barbaric method of fighting. The Romans, surprised by the attack, bumped and pressed by the enemies, crushed in both the front and rear lines of the deployment, had to get off their horses, probably also because of the difficulty of controlling them and because they were unable to maneuver in too narrow a space. In this way, a cavalry clash turned predominantly into a fight between dismounted cavalrymen.

It is believed that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments authorized by Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively. That said, while most historians believe that Hannibal's action was deliberate, there are those who have called this narrative fictional, and they claim that the actions described represent first the natural curvature that occurs when a broad infantry front marches forward and then (when the direction of the crescent was reversed) the retreat of the Carthaginian center caused by the shocking action of meeting the center of the Roman line where the forces were greatly concentrated.

After the brief initial phase of clashes between the light infantry units, the Roman legions, led by the consulars Marcus Minucius Rufus and Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, began their massive frontal attack from which the consuls expected decisive results; in close formation, protected by their long shields side by side, with gladii at the ready on their right hand, the legionaries methodically approached the crescent formed by the Ibero-Gallic infantry, initially striking only the tip of the opposing array. With the maniples deployed in deep rows and the more experienced legionaries present in the front lines and central areas of the legions, the Romans, more than 55,000 soldiers against about 20,000, exerted an irresistible impact against the thin enemy front.

On the right wing of the Carthaginian army, the Numids endeavored to engage and hold back the cavalry allied to the Romans, and the battle in this sector was prolonged without decisive results. After defeating the Roman cavalry, Asdrubal's Hispanic and Gallic horsemen rushed to the aid of the Numids, and the cavalry allied to the Romans was overwhelmed and dispersed, abandoning the battlefield. The Numids pursued them out of the field. Livy includes in his narrative the episode of a deception of the Carthaginian light cavalry:

As the Romans advanced, the wind from the east according to Theodore Dodge or the Volturno from the south according to Livy blew dust into their faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created should instead have been a limiting factor for vision. Even if the dust had made vision difficult, the troops would still have been able to see each other at close range. Dust, however, was not the only psychological factor involved in the battle. Because the location of the battle was somewhat distant from both camps, both sides were forced to fight after insufficient night rest. The Romans faced another inconvenience caused by the lack of proper hydration due to Hannibal's attack on the Roman camp during the previous day. In addition, the very large number of troops caused an extraordinary amount of background noise. All these psychological factors made the battle particularly difficult for the infantrymen.

After less than an hour of hand-to-hand fighting between the Ibero-Gallians and the disciplined Roman legions, which were unbeatable in a frontal confrontation because of the cohesion of the array, the skill of the centurions, and the superiority of the armament, the Carthaginian lines began to fall back, suffering numerous losses.

Hannibal then began the controlled withdrawal of his men into the weak center of the front. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops bent inward as the warriors withdrew. Knowing the superiority of the Roman legionaries, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to retreat voluntarily, thus creating an increasingly tight semicircle around the attacking Roman forces. In this way, he had turned the striking force of the Roman legions also led by Consul Aemilius Paulus, having survived the cavalry clash, into an element of weakness. Moreover, while the front lines were gradually advancing, most of the Roman troops began to lose cohesion as they began to crowd forward to hasten the expected victory. Soon under pressure from the successive lines the deployment of the legions became even tighter, more massive and compressed, limiting the legionaries' space and freedom of movement.

In this critical phase, Hannibal and Mago succeeded in the difficult task of avoiding a total collapse of the Ibero-Gallic forces and maintaining a defensive array that, although suffering heavy losses, did not shatter but managed to fall back slowly while preserving cohesion and allowing the Carthaginian leader to complete his daring combined maneuver on the flanks and behind the great mass of legions in tight formation also because, pressing forward with the desire to crush the Hispanic and Gallic troops as soon as possible, the Romans had ignored (perhaps also because of the dust) the African troops who were uncommitted on the projecting ends of the now overthrown crescent.

Thanks to the maneuver, although the Ibero-Gallian infantry suffered losses of more than 5,000 men from the deadly frontal striking power of the Roman legionaries, Hannibal was able to buy enough time for the Carthaginian cavalry to force the Roman cavalry on both flanks to flee and to attack the Roman center in the rear. He also ensured that the Romans dangerously exposed the flanks where the less experienced divisions of the Roman-Italic legions were deployed.

Roman legionnaires' massacre

The Roman infantry, now exposed on both flanks because of the cavalry rout, had then formed a wedge driven deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, advancing into a gap having African infantry on either side. At this point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry, which he had trained to fight in less tight, hand-to-hand formations with the gladius, renouncing Hoplite tactics, to turn inward and advance against the enemy's flanks, creating an encirclement of the Roman legions in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer maneuver.

When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans from behind, and the African infantrymen assaulted them on the left and right flanks, the Roman infantry advancing in front was forced to halt. On the flanks the Roman legionaries were in serious difficulty and, surprised by the appearance of the African heavy infantry, could not contain the enemy. Flowing back with heavy losses these flanking units went to collide with the other lines of the legions, forcing them to halt, increasing confusion and preventing the mass of legionaries from entering combat due to lack of space.

Thus, the mass of legionaries found themselves clamped in on all sides, compressed into an ever-shrinking space, with only the outer lines in combat on all sides; the Romans were gradually annihilated by the African infantry on the flanks, by the cavalry at the rear, by the Ibero-Gallians in front, in the course of long hours of bloody hand-to-hand combat. The legionaries, crushed against each other, forced to fall back slowly, confused, disoriented by the unexpected turn of events, weary, were slowly destroyed; with the death of the centurions and the loss of their insignia, the legions disintegrated and dissolved; most massed and fell toward the center, small groups were annihilated as they fled in various directions. Polybius is clear in his description of the mechanism of the destruction of the encircled legions: "inasmuch as their outer ranks were continually destroyed, and the survivors were forced to retreat and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood." The Carthaginians continued the massacre of the Romans for about six hours, and, according to the narrative of Livy, the physical exertion of annihilating thousands of Romans with bladed weapons was exhausting even for the African warriors whom Hannibal reinforced with Ibero-Galla heavy cavalry.

The consul Aemilius Paulus, although he had been severely wounded by a sling at the beginning of the fight, decided to stay on the field and fight to the end; at some points he rekindled the battle, under the protection of Roman horsemen. Finally he put aside his horses, because he lacked even the strength to be able to stay in the saddle. Livy relates that when Hannibal learned that the consul had ordered the horsemen to dismount on foot, he is said to have said, "How much I would prefer that he should hand them over to me already tied!" The aristocratic consul eventually fell valiantly in the field, pelted by advancing enemies, unrecognized. The carnage lasted six hours.

Cowley states that about 600 legionnaires were slaughtered every minute until darkness ended the carnage.

Escape of the Roman soldiers

After the death of Aemilius Paulus, the survivors fled in a disorderly fashion: seven thousand men fell back to the smaller camp, ten thousand to the larger one, and about two thousand to the village of Cannae itself; these were immediately surrounded by Cartalus and his horsemen, since no fortifications protected the village. In the two encampments the Roman soldiers were almost unarmed and without commanders; those in the larger camp asked the others to join them, while fatigue still delayed the arrival of the enemies, exhausted by the battle and engaged in victory celebrations, they would all head together to Canusium. Some brusquely rejected the proposal, wondering why they should be the ones to expose themselves so much to danger by going to the major camp and could not instead be the others to go to them. Others did not so much dislike the proposal as lack the courage to move.

Titus Livy at this point relates the episode of the military tribune Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, who is said to have said to them, "Would you then rather be captured by a greedy and ruthless enemy, that the price of your heads be estimated, and asked for by those who will ask whether you are Roman citizens or Latin allies, so that your shame and misery will procure honor for others? You will not want it, even if you are the fellow citizens of the consul Lucius Aemilius, who preferred to die valiantly rather than to live ignominiously, and of the many valiant ones who are crowded around him. But, before the light catches us here and denser enemy turmoil closes our way, let us erupt, opening our way among these disorderly drags who cackle at the gates! With iron and daring we make our way even among dense enemy ranks. Wedged close together, we will pass through these relaxed and disheveled people as if nothing opposes us. Come, therefore, all of you with me, if you want to save yourselves and the Republic!"Having said this, the military tribune managed to convince a part of the legionaries and with them carried out a sortie; although they were pelted by the arrows of the Numids, six hundred of them managed to repair to the major camp. After they were joined by a large host of soldiers, they reached Canusius at midnight. All these details, not found in Polybius, were considered by De Sanctis to be partly imaginary.

The end of the battle

In the evening, having achieved complete victory, the Carthaginians suspended their pursuit of the enemies, returned to the camp, and, a few festive hours having passed, went to sleep. During the night, because of the wounded still lying on the plain, moans and shouts echoed. The next morning the depredation by the Carthaginians of the bodies of the Romans who had fallen in battle began. Since the deadly and unquenchable hatred that the Carthaginians felt for their enemies had not been appeased by the massacre of 40,000 of them, they beat and stabbed the wounded still alive wherever they found them, as a kind of morning pastime after the hard labors of the previous days. This massacre, however, could hardly be regarded as cruelty to the poor victims, for many of them uncovered their chests to their assailants, and invoked the death blow that would end their suffering. While exploring the camp, a Carthaginian soldier was found still alive, but imprisoned by the corpse of his Roman enemy lying on top of him. The Carthaginian's face and his ears were horribly lacerated. The Roman, falling on top of him when both were badly wounded, had continued to fight with his teeth as he could no longer use his weapon, and died at last, pinning his exhausted enemy with his own lifeless body.

Romans and allies

Polybius wrote that of the Roman infantry and allies, 70,000 were killed, 10,000 captured, and "perhaps" only 3,000 survived. He also reports that of the 6,000 Roman and allied horsemen, only 370 managed to get to safety.

Livy wrote: "45,000 infantrymen, it is said, and 2,700 horsemen, half Roman and half allied, fell slain: among them the two quaestors of the consuls: Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibàculus, and twenty-nine tribunes of the soldiers, some consular and formerly praetors or edifices (among them Cnaeus Servilius and Marcus Minucius, who had been master of the cavalry the previous year and consul some years back); and also eighty

Appian of Alexandria said 50,000 were killed and "very many" were taken prisoners. Plutarch agreed, "50,000 Romans fell in that battle Quintilian wrote, "60,000 men were killed by Hannibal at Cannae." Eutropius: "20 consular officials and of praetorian rank, 30 senators and 300 others of noble descent were taken or killed as well as 40,000 infantrymen and 3,500 cavalry."

Most modern historians, while considering Polybius' figures wrong, are willing to accept Livy's figures. Some more recent historians have arrived at much lower figures. Cantalupi proposed that Roman losses were between 10,500 and 16,000. Samuels, too, regards Livy's figures as too high on the grounds that cavalry would have been insufficient to prevent the Roman infantry from escaping. He also doubts that Hannibal Barca wanted a high death toll since much of the army was composed of Italics whom he hoped to have as allies in the future.

Toward the end of the battle, a Roman officer named Lentulus, while fleeing on horseback, saw another officer sitting on the stone, weak and bleeding. When he discovered that it was Aemilius Paulus he offered him his own horse, but Aemilius, seeing that it was too late to save his own life, declined the offer and urged Lentulus to flee as soon as possible, saying, "Go ahead, then, yourself, as fast as you can, make the most of your way to Rome. Call the local authorities here, to me, that all is lost, and they must do what they can for the defense of the city. Go as fast as you can, or Hannibal will be at the gates before you." Aemilius also sent a message to Fabius, declining responsibility for the battle and declaring that he had done what was in his power to continue the strategy. Lentulus, having received this message, and seeing that the Carthaginians were close to him, left, abandoning Aemilius Paulus to his fate. The Carthaginians, noticing the wounded man, stabbed their spears one at a time into his body until he stopped moving. The day after the battle Hannibal was pleased to honor the enemy by ordering the funeral of Consul Aemilius Paulus. His body was placed on a lofty stake and was eulogized by Hannibal, who threw over the corpse a chlamys woven of gold and a flaming drape of somber purple, and thus bade him a final farewell: "Go, O glory of Italy, where abide exalted spirits of distinguished valor! Death has already given you immortal praise while Fortune still agitates my events and hides the future from me."

Instead, Varro took refuge in Venosa with a troop of about fifty horsemen and decided that he would try to gather the remnants of the army there.

Punics and allies

Livy reports that Hannibal lost 6,000 men. Polybius reports 5,700 dead: 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spaniards and Africans, and 200 horsemen.

Hannibal commanded that at the splendor of dawn the following day the dead comrades be buried with funeral pyres.

For a short time, the Romans were in complete chaos. Their best armies on the peninsula had been destroyed, the remaining few were greatly demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) was completely discredited. It was a terrible catastrophe for the Romans. As the story goes, Rome declared a day of national mourning, as there was no one in Rome who did not have some relation to a person who had died there or who was not at least acquainted with them. The main measures taken by the Senate were to cease all public processions, ban women from leaving their homes, and punish street vendors, all these decisions to stop the panic. They became so desperate that, led by the senatorial political class in which Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus had returned to dominance, they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive in the Forum of Rome and abandoning a large child in the Adriatic Sea. Livy reports that the sacrifice was decreed by the "decemviri sacrorum" after their consultation of the Sibylline Books (libri fatales). Based on the response to proceed with "sacrificia aliquot extraordinaria" (some extraordinary sacrifices), a Celtic man and woman and two Greeks were buried alive in the Forum Boarium. Prior to such bloody rites, Plutarch records how in 228 B.C., similar human sacrifices had already taken place before the war against the Insubrians (perhaps one of the last recorded instances of human sacrifices that the Romans would perform, unless public executions of defeated enemies dedicated to Mars are counted). Lucius Caecilius Metellus, a military tribune, is known to have been very desperate for the Roman cause following the battle, so much so that he believed all was lost and therefore invited the other tribunes to flee abroad by sea and serve for some foreign prince. Later because of this proposal he was forced to take an unbreakable oath of allegiance to Rome.

Moreover, the Roman survivors of Cannae were later reunited into two legions and assigned to Sicily for the remainder of the war, as punishment for their humiliating abandonment of the battlefield. In addition to the physical loss of its army, Rome would suffer a symbolic defeat of prestige. A gold ring was a sign of membership in the patrician classes of Roman society. Hannibal with his army had collected more than 200 gold rings from corpses on the battlefield, and this collection was believed to be equal to "three and a half moggia," or more than 27 liters. He sent, in the hands of his brother Magon Barca, all the rings to Carthage as proof of his victory. The collection was poured on the vestibule of the Carthaginian curia.

Hannibal, having won yet another victory (after the battles of the Trebbia and Lake Trasimeno), had defeated the equivalent of eight consular armies (sixteen legions plus an equal number of allies). Within the three seasons of the military campaign (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of its entire population of citizens over the age of seventeen. Moreover, the moral effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy was induced to join Hannibal's cause. After the battle of Cannae, the southern Greek provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Taranto (two of the largest city-states in Italy) all revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal. As Polybius notes, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, compared to those that preceded it, can be seen from the behavior of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshakable, now it has begun to waver for the simple reason that they despair of Roman power." In the same year, Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control. The Macedonian king Philip V, had pledged his support to Hannibal, and the first Macedonian war against Rome was therefore launched. The newly appointed King Hieronymus of Syracuse, ruler of the only place in Sicily that was independent, agreed on an alliance with Hannibal.

After the battle, Maarbale, commander of the Numidian cavalry, urged Hannibal to seize the opportunity and march on Rome immediately, saying, "Indeed, so that you may know well how much has been achieved by this day, in five days you will be feasting victoriously on the Capitol. Follow me, I will precede you with the cavalry, so that they may know you have arrived before they learn that you have set out on the march." The latter's refusal is said to have provoked an exclamation from Maarbale: "The gods evidently did not grant the same person all the gifts: you know how to win, Hannibal, but you do not know how to take advantage of victory." But Hannibal had good reason to judge the strategic situation after the battle differently than Maarbale did. As historian Hans Delbrück points out, because of the large number of dead and wounded in its ranks, the Punic army was in no condition to execute a direct attack on Rome. A march toward the city on the Tiber would have been an unnecessary demonstration that would have nullified the psychological effect of Cannae on Rome's allies. Even if his army had been at full strength, a successful siege of Rome would have required Hannibal to subdue a considerable part of the hinterland in order to secure his own supply and prevent that of the enemy. Even after the huge losses suffered at Cannae, and the defection of a number of its allies, Rome still had abundant manpower to prevent this and at the same time maintain considerable forces in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia, and elsewhere, despite Hannibal's presence in Italy. As Sean McKnight of the Sandhurst Military Academy puts it, "The Romans probably still had plenty of men available who were willing to enlist, the city would have rallied new troops and defended itself strenuously, committing its army to such a risky venture could have thwarted the victories of the military campaign. But perhaps considering that Hannibal eventually lost the war, it was a risk he should have taken." Hannibal's behavior after his victories at Trasimeno (217 B.C.) and at Cannae (216 B.C.), and the fact that he first attacked Rome itself only five years later (in 211 B.C.), suggests that his strategic goal was not the destruction of his enemy, but to deter the Romans with a series of battlefield massacres and to reduce them to a moderate peace agreement by depriving them of their allies.

Immediately after Cannae, Hannibal sent Cartalon to Rome to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. Yet, despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Roman Senate refused to negotiate. Rather, it redoubled the Romans' efforts again, declaring full mobilization of the Roman male population and created new legions by enlisting landless peasants and even slaves. These measures were so severe that the word "peace" was forbidden, mourning was limited to only 30 days, and public externalization of grief was forbidden even for women. The Romans, having experienced this catastrophic defeat and lost other battles, had at this point learned their lesson. For the remainder of the war in Italy, they would no longer amass large forces under a single command against Hannibal, as had been the case during the Battle of Cannae, instead they would use multiple independent armies, still outnumbering the Punic forces in number of armies and soldiers. This war still had occasional battles, but was centered more around taking strongholds and constant fighting, according to the strategy of Quintus Fabius Maximus. This finally forced Hannibal with his shortage of personnel to retreat to Croton, from where he was recalled to Africa for the Battle of Zama, ending the war with a complete Roman victory.

Role in military history

The Battle of Cannae has remained famous for the tactics followed by Hannibal and the role it played in Rome's history. It was perhaps the bloodiest single-day pitched battle ever fought in the West. On this occasion, not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner that would not be repeated for more than a century, until the lesser-known Battle of Arausium, but a battle also took place that was destined to acquire significant notoriety in the field of all military history. As a military historian, Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote:

As Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of military prowess, never surpassed in history and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years." It is, among other things, the first attested use of pincer maneuver in the Western world.

The "model of Canne"

Considered the quintessential example of cunning and skillful maneuvering, it is still the battle most studied by military personnel and experts in tactics and strategy. In addition to being one of the greatest defeats ever inflicted on the Roman army, the Battle of Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation. The clash also assumed a "mythical" role in the strategic science of modern armies; in particular, the German-Prussian General Staff regarded the strategic scheme of the Battle of Cannae as an ideal endpoint to be sought constantly in warfare. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in World War II, once wrote: "Every land commander seeks the battle of annihilation; to the extent that conditions permit, he seeks to duplicate in modern warfare the classic example of Cannae."

The totality of Hannibal's victory made the name "Canne" synonymous with military success, and today it is studied in detail in numerous military academies around the world. The idea that an entire army could be surrounded and annihilated in one fell swoop has fascinated successive Western strategists for centuries and centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke) who have attempted to recreate their own "Canne." The seminal study implemented by Hans Delbrück regarding the battle had a profound influence on later German military theorists, particularly the chief of staff in the imperial army Alfred von Schlieffen (whose "eponymous plan" to invade France, was inspired by Hannibal's tactics). Through his writings, Schlieffen taught that the "Canne model" would continue to be applicable in wartime maneuvers throughout the 20th century:

Schlieffen later developed his operative doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were later translated and published in a work entitled Cannae.

There are three main accounts of the battle, none of them contemporary with it. The closest is that of Polybius, written 50 years after the battle. Titus Livy wrote his own at the time of Augustus, and Appian of Alexandria even later. Appian's account describes events that bear no relation to those of Livy and Polybius. Polybius portrays the battle as the final nadir of Roman fortunes, serving as a literary device so that the subsequent Roman recovery was more dramatic. For example, some argue that his casualty figures are exaggerated, "more symbolic than real." Scholars tend to underestimate Appian's account. Philip Sabin's judgment, "a worthless farrago," is typical.

The commander of the Romans

In his writings, Titus Livius portrays the Roman Senate as playing the leading role in the victorious resistance of the Republic and assigns responsibility for the defeat to the consul Varro, a man of popular origin. Attributing much of the blame to Varro's mistakes also serves the Latin historian to mask the shortcomings of the Roman soldiers, whose patriotism and valor he idealizes and extols in his writings. Polybius did the same, trying to exonerate his own patron's grandfather, Aemilius Paulus, as much as possible.

According to Gregory Daly, Varro's popular origins may have been exaggerated by the sources and he was turned into a scapegoat by the aristocracy. In fact, Varro lacked the powerful descendants that Aemilius Paulus had; descendants who were willing and able to protect his reputation. Historian Martin Samuels also questioned whether Varro was actually in command on the day of the battle, since Lucius Aemilius Paulus positioned himself on the right side. Gregory Daly notes that, in the Roman army, the commander-in-chief was always deployed on the right. He also points out that, according to Polybius' account, Hannibal in his exhortation before the Battle of Zama had reminded his soldiers that they had fought against Lucius Aemilius Paulus at Cannae; the author concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day of the clash, but he considers this of limited importance since both consuls shared a desire to face the enemy in a great battle. Moreover, the warm reception Varro received after the battle from the Senate was in sharp contrast to the fierce criticism reserved, according to historical authors, for the other commanders. Samuels doubts that Varro would have been warmly received had he been in command and solely responsible for the defeat. Finally, historian Mark Healy states that it could be determined, based on an alternative calculation of the days of the rotation of the consuls' command, that on the day of the battle Aemilius Paulus and not Varro held command over the Roman army.

The site of the battle

On the determination of the exact place where the battle was fought remains a dispute that has not been fully resolved. However, there is no question that the battle took place in the territory of ancient Apulia.

In the Genoese dialect, it is common to use an expression that can be translated as "being in the reeds," meaning "being in trouble": it is a reminder of this battle from the point of view of the Romans, who had a mighty defeat here, with consequences for the war itself.

Sources

1. Battle of Cannae
2. Battaglia di Canne
3. ^ a b c Periochae, 22.10.
4. ^ a b Polibio, L. III, 117.
5. ^ a b c d Tito Livio, XXII, 49.
6. ^ a b Tito Livio, XXII, 52.
7. ^ Although some authors state the result was a decisive victory for Carthage, the majority of authors do not apply this label to the result.
8. Liddell Hart, Basil, Strategy, New York City, New York, Penguin Group, 1967
9. a b c d e f g h i j k l Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965, ISBN 0-237-44320-1
10. Πλούταρχος, Βίοι Παράλληλοι, Φάβιος Μάξιμος, 3.1. ο οποίος αποκαλεί την λίμνη «Θρασυνία»
11. Liddell Hart, Basil. Strategy. New York City, New York: Penguin Group, 1967.
12. Πολύβιος, βιβλίο Γ΄, κεφ. 107, 9-15
13. Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome. Evans Bros, 1965, ISBN 0-237-44320-1. p92